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WHOSE EYES ARE YOU GOING TO BELIEVE? SCOTT V. 
HARRIS AND THE PERILS OF COGNITIVE ILLIBERALISM 
Dan M. Kahan,∗ David A. Hoffman∗∗ & Donald Braman∗∗∗ 
This Article accepts the unusual invitation to “see for yourself” issued by the Supreme Court 
in Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).  Scott held that a police officer did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment when he deliberately rammed his car into that of a fleeing motorist who 
refused to pull over for speeding and instead sought to evade the police in a high-speed 
chase.  The majority did not attempt to rebut the arguments of the single Justice who 
disagreed with its conclusion that “no reasonable juror” could find that the fleeing driver 
did not pose a deadly risk to the public.  Instead, the Court uploaded to its website a video 
of the chase, filmed from inside the pursuing police cruisers, and invited members of the 
public to make up their own minds after viewing it.  We showed the video to a diverse sample 
of 1350 Americans.  Overall, a majority agreed with the Court’s resolution of the key issues, 
but within the sample there were sharp differences of opinion along cultural, ideological, and 
other lines.  We attribute these divisions to the psychological disposition of individuals to 
resolve disputed facts in a manner supportive of their group identities.  The Article also 
addresses the normative significance of these findings.  The result in the case, we argue, 
might be defensible, but the Court’s reasoning was not.  Its insistence that there was only one 
“reasonable” view of the facts itself reflected a form of bias — cognitive illiberalism — that 
consists in the failure to recognize the connection between perceptions of societal risk and 
contested visions of the ideal society.  When courts fail to take steps to counteract that bias, 
they needlessly invest the law with culturally partisan overtones that detract from the law’s 
legitimacy.  
INTRODUCTION 
or Craig Jones, it had to be one of those sinking moments when a law-
yer arguing a case before the Supreme Court realizes, with stomach-
turning certitude, that all is lost.  Not only were the Justices broadcasting 
in their questions at oral argument that they were disposed to rule against 
him.  They were making clear that their inclinations rested on a foundation 
that simply does not admit of counterargument: brute sense impressions. 
Jones was representing Victor Harris, a motorist who had been ren-
dered a quadriplegic when police officer Timothy Scott deliberately 
rammed Harris’s vehicle at the end of a high-speed chase, causing it to flip 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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over an embankment and crash.1  Jones’s task was to defend the judgment 
of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which had ruled that Scott was 
not entitled to summary judgment in Harris’s suit for violation of his 
Fourth Amendment rights.2  But within seconds of beginning to explain 
why there was a “genuine issue” of fact3 on whether Harris’s flight posed 
a danger to the public sufficient to justify use of deadly force against him, 
Jones was confronted with what Justice after Justice cited as dispositive 
evidence to the contrary: a videotape of the chase filmed from inside po-
lice cruisers. 
“Mr. Jones,” Justice Alito started, “I looked at the videotape on this.  It 
seemed to me that [Harris] created a tremendous risk [to] drivers on that 
road.”4  “He created the scariest chase I ever saw since ‘The French Con-
nection,’” Justice Scalia immediately chimed in, provoking laughter 
throughout the courtroom.5 
Probably even more dispiriting was the exchange that came next with 
Justice Breyer, whose vote Jones had likely been counting on for affir-
mance.  “I was with you when I read . . . the opinion of the court below,” 
Justice Breyer related.6  “Then I look at that tape, and I have to say that 
when I looked at the tape, my reaction was somewhat similar to Justice 
Alito’s.”7  As Jones attempted to offer a less damaging interpretation of the 
tape’s contents, reinforced by an invocation of the jury’s prerogatives as 
factfinder, Justice Breyer sharply retorted: 
  JUSTICE BREYER: . . . What am I supposed to assume? . . . I mean, I 
looked at the tape and that tape shows he is weaving on both sides of the lane, 
swerving around automobiles that are coming in the opposite direction with 
their lights on, goes through a red light where there are several cars that are 
right there, weaves around them, and there are cars coming the other way, 
weaves back, goes down the road. 
  . . . [A]m I supposed to pretend I haven’t seen that? . . .  
  MR. JONES: Well, I didn’t see that. 
  JUSTICE BREYER: You didn’t see that?  
 . . . . 
  MR. JONES: But those are not the facts that were found by the court be-
low in this — 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 1 See Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1773 (2007). 
 2 Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807 (11th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Scott, 127 S. Ct. 1769. 
 3 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (summary judgment appropriate when “the pleadings, the discovery and 
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”). 
 4 Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Scott, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (No. 05-1631). 
 5 Id. at 28. 
 6 Id. at 30–31. 
 7 Id. at 31. 
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  JUSTICE BREYER: Well that’s, that’s what I wonder.  If the court says 
that isn’t what happened, and I see with my eyes that is what happened, what 
am I supposed to do?8 
Later, during the rebuttal argument of opposing counsel (at which point a 
helpless Jones was reduced to watching mute), Justice Breyer continued, “I 
look at the tape and I end up with Chico Marx’s old question with respect 
to the Court of Appeals: Who do you believe, me or your own eyes?”9 
When the opinion was handed down some ten weeks later, a majority 
of Justices had indeed decided to “call it” as they “saw it.”  Acknowledg-
ing that although normally “courts are required to view the facts and draw 
reasonable inferences ‘in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 
[summary judgment] motion,’”10 Justice Scalia, writing for an eight-Justice 
majority, stated, “[t]here is . . . an added wrinkle in this case: existence in 
the record of a videotape capturing the events in question.”11  “When op-
posing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contra-
dicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court 
should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a mo-
tion for summary judgment,”12 Justice Scalia reasoned.  “Respondent’s 
version of events is so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable 
jury could have believed him.”13 
Somewhat inconveniently for the majority, however, one Justice who 
had watched the tape had in fact taken Harris’s view.  “[T]he tape actually 
confirms, rather than contradicts, the lower courts’ appraisal of the factual 
questions at issue,”14 Justice Stevens announced in dissent. 
But having grounded its decision in its senses, the majority saw no 
need to resort to reasoned elaboration of its position to rebut Stevens’s ap-
prehension of facts “no reasonable juror” could have seen.  Instead, creat-
ing the Court’s first (and so far only) multimedia cyber-opinion, it supplied 
a URL for a digital rendering of the tape that had been uploaded to the 
Court’s website.  “We are happy,” Scalia wrote, “to allow the videotape to 
speak for itself.”15 
Well, does the Scott v. Harris16 tape speak for itself?  If so, what does 
it say? 
We decided to conduct an empirical study to answer these questions.  
We showed the video to a diverse sample of approximately 1350 Ameri-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 8 Id. at 44–45. 
 9 Id. at 54. 
 10 Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1774 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 
654, 655 (1962)). 
 11 Id. at 1775. 
 12 Id. at 1776. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. at 1781 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 15 Id. at 1775 n.5 (majority opinion).  
 16 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007). 
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cans.  We then asked them to tell us what they saw, and give us their views 
on the issues that the Court had identified as dispositive. 
Our subjects didn’t see things eye to eye.  A fairly substantial majority 
did interpret the facts the way the Court did.  But members of various sub-
communities did not.  African Americans, low-income workers, and resi-
dents of the Northeast, for example, tended to form more pro-plaintiff 
views of the facts than did the Court.  So did individuals who character-
ized themselves as liberals and Democrats. 
Individuals with these characteristics tend to share a cultural orientation 
that prizes egalitarianism and social solidarity.  Various highly salient, 
“symbolic” political issues — from gun control to affirmative action, from 
the death penalty to environmental protection — feature conflict between 
persons who share this recognizable cultural profile and those who hold an 
opposing one that features hierarchical and individualistic values.17  We 
found that persons who subscribed to the former style tended to perceive 
less danger in Harris’s flight, to attribute more responsibility to the police 
for creating the risk for the public, and to find less justification in the use 
of deadly force to end the chase.  Indeed, these individuals were much 
more likely to see the police, rather than Harris, as the source of the dan-
ger posed by the flight and to find the deliberate ramming of Harris’s vehi-
cle unnecessary to avert risk to the public. 
Thus, the question posed by the data is not, as Justice Breyer asked, 
whether to believe one’s eyes, but rather whose eyes the law should be-
lieve when identifiable groups of citizens form competing factual percep-
tions.  That’s a normative question, which this Article will also try to an-
swer. 
We will argue that the Court in Scott was wrong to privilege its own 
view.  Although an admitted minority of American society, citizens dis-
posed to see the facts differently from the Scott majority share a perspec-
tive founded on common experiences and values.  By insisting that a case 
like Scott be decided summarily, the Court not only denied those citizens 
an opportunity, in the context of jury deliberations, to inform and possibly 
change the view of citizens endowed with a different perspective.  It also 
needlessly bound the result in the case to a process of decisionmaking that 
deprived the decision of any prospect of legitimacy in the eyes of that sub-
community whose members saw the facts differently.  Told that the law 
must be made in a fashion that rigorously excludes their understanding — 
which the opinion in Scott stigmatizes as being one only “unreasonable” 
people could hold — those who disagree with the outcome cannot divorce 
their assent to it from acceptance of their status as defeated outsiders.  We 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 17 See generally JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE 
AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (2d ed. 1986) (describing historical and contemporary dis-
putes between cultural groups). 
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won’t attempt to articulate a comprehensive theory of the function of the 
jury in promoting the democratic legitimacy of law.  But we will argue that 
no normatively credible theory of this sort can be reconciled with the Scott 
Court’s inattention to the shared identity of citizens likely to form a differ-
ent understanding of the risks depicted in the videotape. 
This is not to say that we believe, necessarily, that there is no credible 
normative defense of the result in Scott.  One might take the position, for 
example, that Scott and cases like it should be decided summarily not be-
cause the understanding of social reality associated with a particular cul-
tural subcommunity is inherently “unreasonable,” but because allowing the 
law to credit it could result in inconsistent jury verdicts across jurisdictions 
or within jurisdictions over time.  Alternatively, one might take the posi-
tion that courts should not allow the law to credit a subcommunity’s view 
of the facts because doing so could result in bad practical consequences for 
law enforcement.  Or one might argue that cases like Scott should be dis-
missed because the appropriateness of high-speed police chases should not 
be determined by courts, but by democratically accountable legislative 
bodies.  We aren’t fully convinced by these arguments.  But we are certain 
that any of these rationales would have been superior to the one the Court 
offered, because none would have incurred the cost to democratic legiti-
macy associated with labeling the perspective of persons who share a par-
ticular cultural identity “unreasonable” and hence unworthy of considera-
tion in the adjudicatory process. 
In addition to explaining how the Court got it wrong in Scott, we will 
also venture a diagnosis of why it did.  The Court’s mistake, we’ll argue, 
reflects a type of decisionmaking hubris that has cognitive origins and that 
has deleterious consequences that extend far beyond the Court’s decision 
in Scott.  Social psychology teaches us that our perceptions of fact are per-
vasively shaped by our commitments to shared but contested views of in-
dividual virtue and social justice.  It also tells us that although our ability 
to perceive this type of value-motivated cognition in others is quite acute, 
our power to perceive it in ourselves tends to be quite poor.18  We thus si-
multaneously experience overconfidence in the unassailable correctness of 
the factual perceptions we hold in common with our confederates and un-
warranted contempt for the perceptions associated with our opposites.  
When these dispositions become integrated into law — as we believe they 
did in Scott — they generate needless cultural and political conflict that 
enervates the law’s political legitimacy.19  Judges, legislators, and ordinary 
citizens should therefore always be alert to the influence of this species of 
“cognitive illiberalism” and take the precautions necessary to minimize it. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 18 See Robert J. Robinson, Dacher Keltner, Andrew Ward & Lee Ross, Actual Versus Assumed Dif-
ferences in Construal: “Naive Realism” in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 414–16 (1995). 
 19 See Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2007). 
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This Article will present and elaborate on these various claims over the 
course of three Parts.  Part I will look more closely at the issue and opin-
ions in Scott, including the Court’s provocative invitation to readers to 
view the tape and decide for themselves whether the majority or dissent 
got it right.  Part II will describe the theoretical underpinnings, the design, 
and the results of the empirical study we conducted in response to the 
Court’s invitation.  Part III will then set forth our normative analysis of 
what the study results say about the correctness of the Scott decision, about 
the general impact of cognitive illiberalism in adjudication, and about the 
steps judges should take to try to counteract it. 
I.  IT’S OBVIOUS! 
We consider first the story of Scott v. Harris.  It begins with a rela-
tively familiar challenge — “catch me if you can” — on the roads of 
Georgia and ends with a very unusual one — “see for yourself” — in the 
pages of a Supreme Court opinion. 
Just before 11:00 p.m. on March 29, 2001, on a two-lane highway in 
the Atlanta suburbs, the police detected Victor Harris speeding.20  But 
when the officers attempted to make a traffic stop, Harris hit the gas pedal, 
fleeing at high speed.21  Soon a car driven by Officer Timothy Scott joined 
the chase.  Knowing little of the inciting situation, Scott had decided on 
his own initiative to help apprehend Harris.22  Following a slow-speed in-
terlude that included a side swiping in an empty shopping mall parking lot, 
the chase returned to the road, reaching speeds in excess of eighty-five 
miles per hour.23  The pursuit ended some six minutes and nine miles after 
it began, when Scott decided to strike Harris’s rear bumper with his car, 
causing Harris, as intended, to spin out of control and crash.24  Scott rec-
ognized that this maneuver involved a significant risk of serious injury or 
death to Harris,25 who in fact suffered a broken neck that left him a quad-
riplegic.26 
Harris filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the use of 
admittedly deadly force to terminate the chase constituted an unreasonable 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 20 Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807, 810 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 21 Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1772; Harris, 433 F.3d at 810. 
 22 See Harris, 433 F.3d at 810. 
 23 Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1772–73; Harris, 433 F.3d at 810.  
 24 Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1773; Harris, 433 F.3d at 810.  Scott had been authorized by his dispatcher to 
use a so-called “Precision Intervention Technique” (PIT) maneuver, a collision technique that is de-
signed to cause a pursued vehicle to spin out and stop, but not necessarily to crash.  See Harris, 433 
F.3d at 810–11.  However, Scott (who was not trained in the PIT maneuver, see id.) decided that he was 
going too fast to execute the maneuver and that it was necessary to “ram[] his cruiser directly into Har-
ris’s vehicle.”  Id. at 811.  
 25 See Harris, 433 F.3d at 814 n.8. 
 26 See id. at 811; Harris v. Coweta County, No. 3:01CV148, 2003 WL 25419527, at *2 (N.D. Ga. 
Sept. 25, 2003). 
KAHAN ET AL. - PAGES.DOC 12/19/08 – 6:01 PM 
8 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:1  
seizure under the Fourth Amendment.27  After the district court denied 
Scott’s claim of qualified immunity,28 Scott took an interlocutory appeal to 
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed.29  In addition to 
upholding the district court’s ruling on immunity,30 the court of appeals 
agreed that Scott was not entitled to summary judgment on the merits of 
Harris’s Fourth Amendment claim: 
 None  of the antecedent conditions for the use of deadly force existed in this 
case.  Harris’ infraction was speeding (73 mph in a 55 mph zone).  There were 
no warrants out for his arrest for anything, much less for the requisite “crime 
involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm.”  In-
deed, neither Scott nor [a second officer] had any idea why Harris was being 
pursued.  The use of deadly force is not “reasonable” in a high-speed chase 
based only on a speeding violation and traffic infractions where there was lit-
tle, if any, actual threat to pedestrians or other motorists, as the roads were 
mostly empty and Harris remained in control of his vehicle, and there is no 
question that there were alternatives for a later arrest.31 
The court also specifically rejected Scott’s argument that “Harris’ driv-
ing must, as a matter of law, be considered sufficiently reckless to give 
Scott probable cause to believe that he posed a substantial threat of immi-
nent physical harm to motorists and pedestrians”:32 
This is a disputed issue to be resolved by a jury.  As noted by the district court 
judge, taking the facts from the non-movant’s viewpoint, Harris remained in 
control of his vehicle, slowed for turns and intersections, and typically used his 
indicators for turns.  He did not run any motorists off the road. . . . [B]y the 
time . . . Scott rammed Harris, the motorway had been cleared of motorists 
and pedestrians allegedly because of police blockades of the nearby intersec-
tions.33 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.  Framed by the questions pre-
sented for review and by the briefs, the case appeared to hinge on two is-
sues.  One was whether Scott was entitled to immunity from suit on the 
ground that any violation of Harris’s Fourth Amendment rights was not 
based on law “clearly established” at the time of the chase.34  The other 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 27 Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1773.  
 28 See Harris, 2003 WL 25419527, at *6. 
 29 See Harris, 433 F.3d at 821.  The court did, however, reverse in part, holding that a second de-
fendant, the officer who authorized the less dangerous, PIT maneuver, was entitled to summary judg-
ment.  See id. at 816–17. 
 30 See id. at 821. 
 31 Id. at 815 (citation omitted) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985)).  
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 815–16 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).  
 34 See Brief for Petitioner at 24, Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007) (No. 05-1631), 2006 WL 
3693418 (“Scott’s decision to use his push bumper to protect the lives of innocent persons from the 
risks created by Harris’s dangerous driving did not violate ‘clearly established’ law.  To find otherwise 
would reduce the requirement of ‘fair and clear warning’ that Scott’s conduct violated the Fourth 
Amendment to no warning at all.”). 
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was the relevance of Tennessee v. Garner,35 which held that police could 
not use deadly force in the form of shooting a fleeing suspect “unless 
. . . the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a sig-
nificant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.”36  
The Eleventh Circuit had relied heavily upon Garner;37 Scott argued for a 
less restrictive standard in the context of a high-speed police chase.38 
But it was the chase videotape, an exhibit in support of the defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment, that proved decisive.  For the Court, the 
facts revealed in the video made it so indisputably clear that Scott was en-
titled to summary judgment that it found no need to resolve the immunity 
issue.39  Justice Scalia wrote: 
[W]e see respondent’s vehicle racing down narrow, two-lane roads in the dead 
of night at speeds that are shockingly fast.  We see it swerve around more than 
a dozen other cars, cross the double-yellow line, and force cars traveling in 
both directions to their respective shoulders to avoid being hit.  We see it run 
multiple red lights and travel for considerable periods of time in the occasional 
center left-turn-only lane, chased by numerous police cars forced to engage in 
the same hazardous maneuvers just to keep up.  Far from being the cautious 
and controlled driver the lower court depicts, what we see on the video more 
closely resembles a Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort, 
placing police officers and innocent bystanders alike at great risk of serious in-
jury.40 
Referring to the conventional rule that disputed facts should be construed 
in favor of the nonmoving party in evaluating a motion for summary 
judgment, Justice Scalia concluded that “[t]he Court of Appeals should not 
have relied on such visible fiction; it should have viewed the facts in the 
light depicted by the videotape.”41 
The Court also found that the tape so manifestly demonstrated the “rea-
sonableness” of the use of deadly force that there was no need to puzzle 
over how to adapt Garner to a car chase.42  The Court evaluated the rea-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 35 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
 36 Id. at 3. 
 37 See Harris, 433 F.3d at 816–17.  
 38 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 14 (“Garner’s framework should be reserved for cases 
in which the officer would know with certainty that his use of force will be deadly.  Applying Garner to 
vehicle-contact cases such as this one would provide the police with very little guidance on when they 
can use direct contact to stop a fleeing vehicle.”). 
 39 The Court reasoned that “because the constitutional question with which we are presented is 
. . . easily decided,” it was not necessary to “address the wisdom” of the disputed precedent, Saucier v. 
Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), which generally requires the merits of a constitutional claim to be consid-
ered prior to any immunity claim.  Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1774 n.4.  Although he agreed with the Court’s 
assessment of the merits, Justice Breyer, in his concurring opinion, took issue with the Court’s failure to 
consider Scott’s immunity argument first.  See id. at 1780–81 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 40 Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1775–76 (majority opinion) (footnotes omitted). 
 41 Id. at 1776. 
 42 Id. at 1778. 
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sonableness of Scott’s actions by looking at several factors, starting first 
with the risks posed to the police, the public, and Harris by the chase: 
Although there is no obvious way to quantify the risks on either side, it is 
clear from the videotape that respondent posed an actual and imminent threat 
to the lives of any pedestrians who might have been present, to other civilian 
motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase.  It is equally clear that 
Scott’s actions posed a high likelihood of serious injury or death to respondent 
— though not the near certainty of death posed by, say, shooting a fleeing 
felon in the back of the head . . . .43 
The Court then attempted to balance these factors by framing the issue 
as one of comparative fault: 
So how does a court go about weighing the perhaps lesser probability of injur-
ing or killing numerous bystanders against the perhaps larger probability of in-
juring or killing a single person?  We think it appropriate in this process to 
take into account not only the number of lives at risk, but also their relative 
culpability.  It was respondent, after all, who intentionally placed himself and 
the public in danger by unlawfully engaging in the reckless, high-speed flight 
that ultimately produced the choice between two evils that Scott confronted.  
Multiple police cars, with blue lights flashing and sirens blaring, had been 
chasing respondent for nearly 10 miles, but he ignored their warning to stop.  
By contrast, those who might have been harmed had Scott not taken the action 
he did were entirely  
innocent.44 
The Court apparently viewed the conclusion of this “relative culpability” 
analysis as likewise so far beyond dispute that no contrary jury determina-
tion would be sustainable: “We have little difficulty in concluding it was 
reasonable for Scott to take the action that he did.”45 
As noted, Justice Stevens, alone, dissented.  Justice Stevens reported 
his own impression that “the tape actually confirms, rather than contra-
dicts, the lower courts’ appraisal of the factual questions at issue.”46  In 
what must have struck the majority as a strangely flattering rebuke, Justice 
Stevens, at eighty-seven the Court’s oldest Justice, attributed his col-
leagues’ contrary perceptions to their comparative youth: “Had they 
learned to drive when most high-speed driving took place on two-lane 
roads rather than on superhighways — when split-second judgments about 
the risk of passing a slow-poke in the face of oncoming traffic were rou-
tine — they might well have reacted to the videotape more dispassion-
ately.”47 
Just as strangely, if not as flatteringly, the Court majority did not 
counter Justice Stevens’s dissent with argument.  As noted, the Court re-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 1781 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 47 Id. at 1781 n.1.  
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plied curtly, “[w]e are happy to allow the videotape to speak for itself.”48  
Answering Chico Marx’s question, Justice Breyer, in a concurring opinion, 
seconded the Court’s “see for yourself” rejoinder: 
Because watching the video footage of the car chase made a difference to my 
own view of the case, I suggest that the interested reader take advantage of the 
link in the Court’s opinion and watch it.  Having done so, I do not believe a 
reasonable jury could, in this instance, find that Officer Timothy Scott (who 
joined the chase late in the day and did not know the specific reason why the 
respondent was being pursued) acted in violation of the Constitution.49 
Indeed, Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg, who also wrote separately, 
were arguably even more emphatic about the impact of the video.  
Whereas the majority opinion appeared to endorse a general rule that all 
uses of deadly force to end dangerous high-speed chases should be treated 
as constitutional,50 these Justices stressed the need to review such pursuits 
case by case.  “[T]he video,” Justice Breyer wrote, “makes clear the highly 
fact-dependent nature of this constitutional determination.”51  Justice Gins-
burg echoed this point in her separate concurrence: 
I do not read today’s decision as articulating a mechanical, per se rule.  The 
inquiry described by the Court is situation specific.  Among relevant consid-
erations: Were the lives and well-being of others (motorists, pedestrians, police 
officers) at risk?  Was there a safer way, given the time, place, and circum-
stances, to stop the fleeing vehicle?  “[A]dmirable” as “[an] attempt to craft an 
easy-to-apply legal test in the Fourth Amendment context [may be],” the Court 
explains, “in the end we must still slosh our way through the factbound morass 
of ‘reasonableness.’”52 
For Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, then, the video mandated summary 
judgment not merely because it foreclosed reasonable disagreement about 
whether a dangerous chase had occurred, but also because, for them at 
least, it foreclosed reasonable disagreement on whether chasing Harris at 
all promoted public safety, whether Harris or the police were more culpa-
ble for the danger of the chase to the public, and ultimately whether the 
use of deadly force was justified in light of the risk that Harris posed. 
II.  TAKING THE SCOTT CHALLENGE 
For those familiar with the Court’s commitments both to reasoned justi-
fication and to safeguarding its exclusive power to interpret the Constitu-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 48 Id. at 1775 n.5 (majority opinion). 
 49 Id. at 1780 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 50 See id. at 1779 (majority opinion) (“[W]e lay down a . . . sensible rule: A police officer’s attempt 
to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or 
death.”). 
 51 Id. at 1780 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 52 Id. at 1779 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting id. at 
1777–78 (majority opinion)). 
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tion, the invitation to members of the public at large to judge the correct-
ness of the decision for themselves by simply applying their senses was a 
conclusion to the case every bit as spectacular as the metal-contorting 
crash that ended Harris’s flight from the police.53  There is, however, an 
obvious problem with the Court’s invitation.  In reporting that he, at least, 
saw something different, Justice Stevens was plainly advancing the claim 
that the tape doesn’t speak for itself — that different people, with different 
experiences, can see different things in it.  No individual who watches the 
tape and comes away agreeing with the Court will be in a position to rebut 
Justice Stevens’s claim, because however clearly that person perceives 
things, the fact remains that she is able to see only what she sees and not 
what anyone else does.  The testing method the Court proposes, in sum, is 
hopelessly solipsistic. 
There is only one way we can think of to accept the Scott majority’s 
proposal that its conclusion be tested by viewing the tape.  It is to get a 
large number of people of diverse experiences and characteristics to watch 
it.  If there are members of this group who do see things differently from 
the majority, one can then try to determine whether there is anything that 
seems to unite the former other than that they are simply “unreasonable.” 
That’s what we decided to do.  We conducted a study to see who sees 
what in the Scott tape and why.  In this Part, we describe that study.  We 
start essentially with the bottom line — a narrative account of what people 
of varying characteristics and backgrounds would likely see were they to 
watch the Scott tape.  We then identify the social psychological theories 
that explain why one might expect certain defining characteristics to affect 
such individuals’ perceptions of facts.  Then we show how these theories 
informed the design and hypotheses of our study.  Finally, we offer a more 
fine-grained reporting of the study results themselves, before summing up. 
One point of clarification, however, must be stressed at the outset.  Al-
though our subjects were instructed to view the video from the perspective 
of a juror deciding the case, we do not understand the results of the study 
to indicate how a case like Scott would come out if it went to trial.  Obvi-
ously, jurors in an actual case would be exposed to more evidence than just 
the video.  They would also hear arguments from counsel.  Most important 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 53 Not surprisingly, this aspect of the Court’s decision has provoked debate in the legal  
academy.  Compare Posting of Orin Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/ 
1172720514.shtml (Feb. 28, 2007, 22:23) (“The right answer is that Justice Breyer should believe his 
own eyes.”), with The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Leading Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV. 185, 222 (2007) 
(arguing that the Court’s analytical approach pushed it to make a bad ruling on an incomplete record), 
Jessica Silber, Justices Taken in by Illusion of Film, Balt. Sun, May 13, 2007, at 21A (“[A]ll film mani-
fests a distinct point of view . . . . Films never speak for themselves . . . .”), and Posting of Dave Hoff-
man to Concurring Opinions, http://www.concurringopinions.com/ 
archives/2007/04/the_death_of_fa.html (Apr. 30, 2007, 13:41) (“[E]ach Justice saw the risk of speeding 
through his or her own cultural prism.”).  See generally Howard M. Wasserman, Video Evidence and 
Summary Judgment: The Procedure of Scott v. Harris, 91 Judicature 108 (2008). 
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of all, they would deliberate.  They might conclude, on such a basis, to 
vote for a verdict contrary to their initial reaction to the tape, particularly if 
that reaction were equivocal.  Our study is designed only to help evaluate 
the assertion that the  
tape “speak[s] for itself”54 — and that what it says is so unequivocal that it 
leaves no room to “believe a reasonable jury could, in this instance, find 
that Officer Timothy Scott . . . acted in violation of the Constitution.”55 
A.  Four Members of the American Venire 
Imagine four Americans (FIGURE 1).  Ron, a white male who lives in 
Arizona, overcame his modest upbringing to become a self-made million-
aire businessperson.  He deeply resents government interference with mar-
kets but is otherwise highly respectful of authority, which he believes 
should be clearly delineated in all spheres of life.  Politically, he identifies 
himself as a conservative Republican.  Bernie, another white male, is a 
university professor who makes a modest salary and lives in Burlington, 
Vermont.  He will go along with the left wing of the Democratic Party, but 
thinks of himself as a “social democrat.”  He advocates highly egalitarian 
conditions in the home, in the workplace, and in society at large, and 
strongly supports government social welfare programs and regulations of 
every stripe.  Linda is an African American woman employed as a social 
worker in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  She is a staunch Democrat and un-
embarrassed to be characterized as a “liberal.”  Finally, there is Pat.  Pat is 
the average American in every single respect: Pat earns the average in-
come, has the average level of education, is average in ideology, is average 
in party identification, holds average cultural values, and is average even 
in race and gender.  If placed on a jury, apprised of the basic issues and 
law, and asked to watch the video in Scott v. Harris, what will these four 
individuals see on the tape, and how will the tape affect their views of how 
the case should come out prior to deliberating? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 54 Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1775 n.5. 
 55 Id. at 1780 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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Ron Bernie
Linda Pat
Figure 1.  Four Representative Members  
of the American Venire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here is the answer.  Ron will see exactly what the Scott majority saw: 
a very dangerous driver, whom the police correctly pursued from the outset 
and against whom they appropriately used deadly force.  Pat will tend in 
the same direction, but with less certainty; in particular, Pat will be am-
bivalent about whether the risk to the public was worth the chase, but will 
conclude, fairly unequivocally, that terminating it with deadly force was 
warranted given the danger that Harris’s flight posed. 
Linda and Bernie, however, will feel quite differently.  They will be 
fairly adamant that the police, after detecting that Harris was speeding, 
made a serious mistake in conducting a high-speed chase when he refused 
to pull over.  They will tend to agree that the chase posed lethal risks to 
the public and the police, but in contrast to Ron and Pat, they will be 
somewhat equivocal in that judgment.  They will not be equivocal about 
blame: they will perceive the police to be as culpable as Harris or even 
more culpable for the risk the chase created for the public.  And they will 
be fairly strongly disposed to find that the police were not justified in us-
ing deadly force to terminate the chase in light of the danger Harris him-
self posed. 
At least those are the impressions they’ll have before they start to ex-
change their views with one another and explain them in deliberations.  In 
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what follows, we identify the theoretical grounds from which to expect this 
initial array of perceptions, and then turn to the details of the study that 
support this particular account of what individuals like these will likely 
“see” in the Scott tape. 
B.  Theoretical Background: Motivated Cognition  
of Legally Consequential Facts 
Why, to start, might we expect people with characteristics as diverse as 
Ron’s, Linda’s, Pat’s, and Bernie’s not to see “eye to eye” on the Scott 
video?  There are a number of social psychological mechanisms that ex-
plain how the group identities and values associated with such characteris-
tics influence cognition of facts.  They form the theoretical basis for the 
design of our study and its hypotheses. 
One of these mechanisms is the culpable control model of blame.56  
That theory starts with the premise — confirmed by a diverse body of re-
search in psychology, anthropology, and linguistics57 — that people are 
generally disposed to “blame” someone for an action only if they perceive 
that the putatively blameworthy agent made a voluntary choice to act in a 
manner that caused some harm or injury.  Nevertheless, experiments dem-
onstrate that people’s perceptions of the elements of this blaming template 
are highly sensitive to circumstances extrinsic to the template itself.  In 
particular, people are much more disposed to perceive voluntariness, ac-
tion, causation, and harm (as well as other conditions of blaming) when 
the putatively blameworthy agent is behaving in ways that defy social 
norms (perhaps by engaging in an interracial relationship or by using 
drugs), including norms contested across distinct subcommunities.58  In ef-
fect, cognition of blame-relevant “facts” (volition, action, causation, harm) 
is motivated by the subconscious desire to form blame attributions that ac-
cord with moral evaluations of the agent’s character or lifestyle. 
A second theory is identity-protective cognition.59  Individual well-
being, material and emotional, is bound up with membership in various 
self-defining groups.  Rejecting factual beliefs widespread within such a 
group can undermine individual well-being, either by threatening to es-
trange a person from his peers or by forcing that person to contemplate the 
social incompetence of those he identifies with.  As a means of psycho-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 56 See generally Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 556 (2000). 
 57 See, e.g., id. at 556–57 (discussing previous research on blame). 
 58 See id. at 564; see also Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY-
CHOL. 368 (1992). 
 59 See generally Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, John Gastil, Paul Slovic & C.K. Mertz, Culture 
and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the White-Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. EMPIRI-
CAL LEGAL STUD. 465 (2007). 
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logical self-defense, then, people tend to process information in a selective 
fashion that bolsters beliefs dominant within their self-defining groups.60 
Finally, there is the cultural cognition of risk.61  This theory posits that 
people tend to conform factual beliefs about risk to their cultural evalua-
tions of putatively dangerous behavior.  As a result of various cognitive 
mechanisms, people are motivated to believe that behavior they find noble 
is also socially beneficial (or at least benign) and behavior they find base 
is also socially harmful.  For example, people who hold individualist val-
ues discount claims that commerce and industry harm the environment be-
cause they value markets and other forms of private ordering.  People who 
hold egalitarian values, in contrast, readily credit claims of environmental 
risk, the widespread acceptance of which would justify restricting behavior 
— such as commerce and industry — that those people associate with ine-
qualities in wealth.  Alternatively, people who subscribe to hierarchical 
values impute risk to homosexuality, drug use, abortion, subversive speech, 
and other behaviors that defy the authority of traditional, stratified norms 
of behavior, whereas egalitarians and individualists reject these risk claims 
as specious.62 
Combined, these theories furnish strong grounds to expect individuals 
of diverse identities and commitments — like Ron, Linda, Bernie, and Pat 
— to form different perceptions of the facts revealed by the Scott tape.  
The facts highlighted by Justice Scalia’s analysis — how much care Harris 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 60 See generally Joshua Aronson & Claude M. Steele, When Beliefs Yield to Evidence: Reducing 
Biased Evaluation by Affirming the Self, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1151 (2000); 
Geoffrey L. Cohen, Roger Giner-Sorolla & Shelly Chaiken, Selective Use of Heuristic and Systematic 
Processing Under Defense Motivation, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 84 (1997); Geof-
frey L. Cohen, David K. Sherman, Anthony Bastardi, Lillian Hsu, Michelle McGoey & Lee Ross, 
Bridging the Partisan Divide: Self-Affirmation Reduces Ideological Closed-Mindedness and Inflexibility 
in Negotiation, 93 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 415 (2007). 
 61 See generally Dan M. Kahan, Paul Slovic, Donald Braman & John Gastil, Fear of Democracy: A 
Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1083–87 (2006). 
 62 See id. at 1086–87.  This theory is amply supported by a growing body of empirical research.  
See, e.g., Karl Dake, Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of Risk: An Analysis of Contemporary 
Worldviews and Cultural Biases, 22 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 61 (1991); Hank C. Jenkins-
Smith, Modeling Stigma: An Empirical Analysis of Nuclear Images of Nevada, in RISK, MEDIA, AND 
STIGMA: UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC CHALLENGES TO MODERN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 107 
(James Flynn, Paul Slovic & Howard Kunreuther eds., 2001); Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, 
supra note 59; Ellen Peters & Paul Slovic, The Role of Affect and Worldviews As Orienting Dispositions 
in the Perception and Acceptance of Nuclear Power, 26 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1427, 1445 
(1996); Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, Paul Slovic, Geoffrey Cohen & John Gastil, Cultural 
Cognition of the Risks and Benefits of Nanotechnology, NATURE NANOTECHNOLOGY (forthcoming 
2009), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/NNANO.2008.341; Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, Paul 
Slovic, John Gastil & Geoffrey L. Cohen, The Second National Risk and Culture Study: Making Sense 
of — and Making Progress In — The American Culture War of Fact (Yale Law Sch., Public Law Work-
ing Paper No. 154; George Washington Univ., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 370; George Washing-
ton Univ., Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 370, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017189. 
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was taking to avoid colliding with other vehicles,63 how feasible it was for 
other drivers to pull to the side to avoid exposure to collision,64 the rela-
tive harm of chasing Harris or breaking off the pursuit and letting him es-
cape65 — all relate to moral (and legal) attributions of blame.  Perceptions 
of those facts, the culpable control model suggests, are likely to be moti-
vated by extrinsic moral evaluations of the putatively blameworthy actors 
— Harris and the  
police. 
Beliefs about the extent to which the police in general abuse their au-
thority (particularly against minorities), and correspondingly the relative 
preponderance of licit and illicit reasons for attempting to avoid police en-
counters, vary across sociodemographic and political groups.66   Identity-
protective cognition thus suggests that people are likely to construe the 
facts depicted in the tape in a way that reinforces the beliefs that predomi-
nate among their peers. 
Finally, the facts at issue relate to the risks posed by the parties to the 
chase.  Consistent with the theory of cultural cognition, we can expect in-
dividuals to form risk perceptions that reflect the competing, culturally 
grounded affective responses a high-speed police chase is likely to evoke: 
from fear of those who defy lawful authority; to resentment of abuses of 
power by the police; to distrust of authority generally; to anger at apparent 
indifference to the well-being of innocent bystanders.67 
C.  Study Design and Hypotheses 
These understandings of the potential sources of motivated cognition 
suggest a relatively straightforward way to determine whether the Scott 
tape admits of competing interpretations.  By showing the tape to a suffi-
ciently large and diverse group of persons and soliciting their reactions to 
it, one can determine whether differences of belief on key issues vary 
across persons in patterns predicted by cultural cognition, identity-
protective cognition, and the culpable control theory.  As we explain in 
greater detail, this is how we proceeded. 
1.  Sample. — The study sample consisted of approximately 1350 indi-
viduals.  The subjects were drawn randomly from a demographically di-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 63 Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1775–76 (2007). 
 64 See id. at 1775. 
 65 Id. at 1778–79. 
 66 See Daniel Lempert, Belief in a Just World and Perceptions of Fair Treat- 
ment by Police (2007), available at http://www.electionstudies.org/resources/papers/Pilot2006/ 
nes012058.pdf (reporting in Part I results of survey on perceived fairness of police toward criminal sus-
pects).  Cf. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 132–34 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (noting community-specific reactions to avoidance of police).  
 67 See generally Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2008) (describing evidence of the role that affective states play in connecting risk 
perceptions to cultural values). 
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verse panel of some 40,000 online adult Americans assembled by Knowl-
edge Networks for participation in scholarly public opinion analysis.68  
The sample was 51% male and 49% female; and 9% Hispanic, 6% African 
American, and 6% other minority.  The mean age was 47, mean annual 
household income $40,000 to $49,000, and the mean education level was 
“some college.”  The subjects participated in the study over a one-month 
period between late September 2007 and late October 2007. 
2.  Stimulus. — Subjects were exposed to a stimulus consisting of two 
parts.  The first was a textual introduction.  The introduction advised sub-
jects that the point of the survey was to determine how they “would decide 
a real-life lawsuit if [they] were on the jury.”  In addition to setting forth 
the nature of the suit — one brought by Harris alleging that he had suf-
fered injuries when Scott used “unreasonable force” to end a high-speed 
chase — the introduction set forth a list of facts on which “the parties 
agree.”  The list consisted of facts not disputed by the parties when the 
case was before the Supreme Court:69 
The police clocked Harris driving 73 miles per hour on a highway in a 55 
mile-per-hour zone at around 11 pm. 
The police decided to pursue Harris when Harris ignored the police car’s flash-
ing lights and kept driving rather than pulling over. 
The chase lasted around seven minutes and covered eight to nine miles. 
The police determined from the license plate number that the vehicle had not 
been reported stolen. 
Officer Scott joined the chase after it started.  He did not know why the other 
officers had originally tried to stop Harris. 
Scott knew that other police officers had blocked intersections leading to the 
highway but did not know if all of the intersections were blocked. 
Officer Scott deliberately used his police cruiser’s front bumper to hit the rear 
of Harris’s car[,] hoping to cause Harris’s car to spin out and come to a stop. 
Officer Scott knew there was a high risk that ramming the car in this manner 
could seriously injure or kill Harris. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 68 Knowledge Networks is a leading firm in online opinion studies.  Numerous studies have shown 
that the online samples and testing methods of Knowledge Networks yield results equivalent in reliabil-
ity to conventional random-digit-dial surveys, and studies based on those samples and methods are rou-
tinely published in academic journals.  See KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS, KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS BIB-
LIOGRAPHY: ARTICLES AND PRESENTATIONS BASED ON KN COLLECTED PANEL DATA, ANALYSIS, 
OR METHODOLOGY, available at http://www. 
knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/docs/KN%20Bibliog%205-29-2007%20External.pdf; J.M. Dennis, 
Methodological Information About Knowledge Networks for Reviewers, http://www. 
knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/reviewer-info.html (last visited Dec. XXX, 2008). 
 69 Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1772–73; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 2–5; Brief for Respondent at 
12, Scott, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (No. 05-1631), 2007 WL 118977. 
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Harris lost control, crashed, and suffered severe injuries, including permanent 
paralysis from the neck down.70 
The second part of the stimulus consisted of the chase video.  The 
video was identified as having been filmed from inside the pursuing police 
cruisers.  It was also described as “key evidence” relating to facts on 
which the “[p]arties disagree.”  Subjects were requested to “closely watch 
the video . . . just as [members of the jury in the case] would.”71 
The video is approximately six minutes in length.  It starts when the 
police activate their sirens and terminates with a scene of Harris’s flipped-
over vehicle engulfed in thick smoke.  The study video displayed an image 
comparable in size to the video uploaded to the Supreme Court website.  
Like the Supreme Court video, the study video also included sound, which 
consisted of radio communication between the pursuing cars and the police 
dispatcher.  Shortly before Scott rams Harris’s vehicle, the dispatcher is 
heard issuing the instruction to “take him out.” 
The video shown to the subjects was actually a composite of two from 
the trial record, both of which were uploaded to the Supreme Court’s web-
site.72  The two tapes were recorded by the two pursuing police cars, 
which, at around the midpoint of the chase, swap positions relative to the 
fleeing Harris.  The study video consists of those portions of each tape re-
corded when the filming vehicle was the lead car in the chase and omits 
those portions of each recorded when the car filming was in the trailing 
position.  It was necessary to combine the tapes in this fashion to keep the 
total running time of the study short enough to avert high dropout rates 
among study subjects.  Because only the footage shot from inside the lead 
vehicle permits observation of Harris, the study video nevertheless con-
tained all portions of both tapes that bear on the factual disagreements be-
tween the Scott majority and dissent. 
Like the tapes in the Supreme Court record, but unlike the file dis-
played on the Supreme Court website, the study tape was in color.  As a 
result, it permitted subjects to observe the color of overhead traffic lights 
and also clearly to discern the tail lights (including the braking lights) of 
Harris’s car and of vehicles passed during the pursuit.  The black and 
white file displayed on the Supreme Court website, in addition to masking 
these pertinent details, contains myriad indistinct patches of bright or 
flashing light; in the color video, these flashes are revealed to be objects 
such as illuminated roadside street signs, lights in roadside structures, and 
the headlights of cars that are either pulled over, approaching the chase 
from an intersecting street, or traveling in the opposite direction.  Beyond 
furnishing a more vivid (and potentially more chilling) depiction of the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 70 The survey instrument is on file with the Harvard Law School Library. 
 71 The study video can be accessed at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DBY2y2YsmN0. 
 72 We were kindly supplied with the record versions of the tapes by Andrew Clarke, counsel for  
Harris. 
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chase than the file uploaded to the Court’s website, the study tape in this 
respect also more closely resembled the footage observed by the Justices 
themselves. 
3.  Response Measures. — On exactly which facts the Court understood 
the video to be dispositive in Scott is itself open to debate.  Although Jus-
tice Scalia considered a range of issues — the degree of risk Harris’s driv-
ing posed;73 how to “weigh[] the perhaps lesser probability of injuring or 
killing numerous bystanders against the perhaps larger probability of injur-
ing or killing a single person”;74 the “relative culpability” of Harris and 
the police for creating risk to the public75 — his opinion could be read to 
indicate that the constitutionality of deadly force turns on only one fact: 
whether the police and the fleeing driver were involved in a “high-speed 
car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders.”76  Justices 
Breyer and Ginsburg, however, indicated that they did not understand the 
Court’s decision “as articulating a mechanical, per se rule.”77  For them, 
the entire “inquiry described by the Court”78 involved “highly fact-
dependent” questions, the answers to which were “ma[de] clear” by a 
viewing of the video.79  We decided to solicit our subjects’ reactions to the 
entire range of determinations that figured in the Court’s reasoning, both 
because the opinion was arguably ambiguous about which of them were 
matters of fact for the jury to decide and because the possibility that peo-
ple might disagree about them after watching the video struck us as rele-
vant to evaluating which of those facts ought to be ones for a jury in a 
case like Scott. 
One of the key issues was the degree of risk that Harris’s driving 
posed.  Justice Scalia used various formulations to characterize the degree 
of lethal danger that a jury would be required to find in a case like Scott.80  
“Great risk of death” struck us as the one most likely to be understood 
clearly and uniformly among the laypersons in our subject pool.81  Accord-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 73 See Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1775–76. 
 74 Id. at 1778. 
 75 Id.  
 76 Id. at 1779 (“[W]e lay down a more sensible rule: A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dan-
gerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.”). 
 77 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also TAN 51–52. 
 78 Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1779 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 79 Id. at 1780 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 80 See, e.g., id. at 1775–76 (majority opinion) (“[T]he video . . . closely resembles a Hollywood-
style car chase of the most frightening sort, placing police officers and innocent bystanders alike at 
great risk of serious injury.” (emphasis added)); id. at 1778 (“[I]t is clear from the videotape that re-
spondent posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of any pedestrians . . ., to other civilian mo-
torists, and to the officers . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. at 1779 (“The car chase that respondent initiated 
in this case posed a substantial and immediate risk of serious physical injury to others; no reasonable 
jury could conclude otherwise.” (emphasis added)).  
 81 Because the Court emphasized that the tape left no ground for reasonable disagreement on “the 
factual issue whether respondent was driving in such fashion as to endanger human life,” id. at 1776 
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ingly, to assess our subjects’ perceptions of that risk, we asked them to in-
dicate, on a six-point scale, their level of disagreement or agreement with 
these two statements: 
During the pursuit, Harris drove in a manner that put members of the public at 
great risk of death. 
During the pursuit, Harris drove in a manner that put the police at serious risk 
of death. 
The majority opinion in Scott also evaluated the degree of risk the po-
lice created and its magnitude in relation to the risk posed by Harris.  To 
assess our subjects’ perceptions of that issue, we asked them to indicate 
their level of disagreement or agreement (again on a six-point scale) with 
this statement: 
It just wasn’t worth the danger to the public for the police to engage in a high-
speed chase of Harris when he refused to pull over for speeding.  Instead, they 
should have tried to find and arrest him later. 
They were also asked to indicate their assessment of the “relative cul-
pability”82 of the police and Harris: 
Please indicate how much you think the parties were at fault for the risk posed 
to the public by the chase: (1) the police were much more at fault than Harris; 
(2) the police were slightly more at fault than Harris; (3) the police and Harris 
were equally at fault; (4) Harris was slightly more at fault than the police; (5) 
Harris was much more at fault than the police. 
Finally, we asked subjects to indicate their level of disagreement or 
agreement with a statement relating to the outcome of the case: 
The danger that Harris’s driving posed to the police and the public justified 
Officer Scott’s decision to end the chase in a way that put Harris’s own life in 
danger. 
Responses to these five items, when combined, formed a highly reli-
able scale (α = 0.81).83  To facilitate analysis, the scale was coded to re-
flect agreement with the Scott majority and labeled “Agree with Court.”84 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
(emphasis added), we interpret the Court’s references to the “risk of serious injury,” id. at 1772, 1776, 
and a “substantial and immediate risk of serious physical injury,” id. at 1779, as contemplating a degree 
of injury that would be life-threatening.  To avoid the possibility that subjects would construe the term 
“physical injury” as extending to non-life-threatening harm, we chose not to use this phrase and instead 
to refer simply to “great risk of death,” which we judged would uniformly be understood to embrace 
the risk of life-threatening physical injury. 
 82 Id. at 1778. 
 83 Cronbach’s alpha (α) is a statistic for measuring the internal validity of attitudinal scales.  In ef-
fect, it measures the degree of intercorrelation that exists among various items within a scale; a high 
score suggests that the items can be treated as a valid measure of a latent, or unmeasured, attitude or 
trait.  Generally, α ≥ 0.70 suggests scale validity.  See generally Jose M. Cortina, What Is Coefficient 
Alpha? An Examination of Theory and Applications, 78 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 98 (1993).  Because a 
high Cronbach’s alpha confirms that responses to items of opposing valence (e.g., that “[d]uring the 
pursuit, Harris drove in a manner that put members of the public at great risk of death” versus “[i]t just 
wasn’t worth the danger to the public for the police to engage in a high-speed chase of Harris when he 
refused to pull over for speeding”) are indeed negatively correlated, it helps to dispel the concern that 
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4.  Individual Characteristics. — (a)  Demographic Characteristics. — 
We collected data relating to the individual characteristics of the subjects.  
These included conventional sociodemographic characteristics, such as 
gender, race, age, household income, education, community type (urban or 
nonurban) of residence, and region of residence. 
(b)  Political Ideology and Party Affiliation. — Subjects indicated their 
party affiliation — either Republican, Democrat, or neither.  They also in-
dicated their political ideology on a seven-point scale that ran from “ex-
tremely liberal” to extremely conservative (“conservativism”). 
(c)  Cultural Worldviews. — We also collected data on our subjects’ 
cultural orientations and worldviews.  The orientations reflected a scheme 
developed by the late anthropologist Mary Douglas, who characterized 
worldviews, or preferences for how society should be organized, along two 
cross-cutting dimensions — “group” and “grid.”85  A “high group” world-
view generates a preference for a communitarian ordering in which the in-
terests of the individual are subordinated to the needs of the collective, 
which is in turn responsible for securing the conditions of individual flour-
ishing.  A “low group” worldview, in contrast, coheres with a preference 
for an individualist ordering in which individuals are expected to secure 
the conditions of their own flourishing without interference or assistance 
from the collective.  A “high grid” worldview corresponds to a preference 
for a relatively hierarchical ordering, in which entitlements, obligations, 
opportunities and offices are all assigned on the basis of conspicuous and 
largely fixed attributes, such as gender, race, lineage, class, and the like.  A 
“low grid” worldview, in contrast, generates a preference for an egalitarian 
ordering that emphatically rejects the proposition that such distinctions 
should figure in this way in societal conditions.86 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
subjects’ responses reflected acquiescence bias, the tendency “to ‘agree’ with a statement just to avoid 
seeming disagreeable,” RUSSELL K. SCHUTT, INVESTIGATING THE SOCIAL WORLD 241 (5th ed. 
2006). 
 84 Because subjects responded after watching a car crash that they were told resulted in serious in-
jury, one might reasonably wonder whether their responses were affected by “hindsight bias,” which 
consists in overestimating the ex ante likelihood of an event based on ex post knowledge of its occur-
rence.  See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 
U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998).  However, the Scott majority based its ruling not on its anxiety that jurors 
might overreact to the tape (an alternative basis for decision we discuss below, see infra TAN 165–
166), but on its professed confidence that jurors would rule for the defendant on the basis of the tape.  
The possibility of hindsight bias — whatever it might imply about what jurors in a case like Scott 
should be allowed to see — does not pose any difficulty for a study aimed at testing disputed claims 
about how jurors would react if allowed to view it. Moreover, because it is an influence to which all 
subjects are exposed, the possible impact of hindsight bias also does not pose any obstacle to testing 
hypotheses about individual differences in perceptions based on cultural worldviews and other pertinent 
characteristics. 
 85 See generally MARY DOUGLAS, NATURAL SYMBOLS: EXPLORATIONS IN COSMOLOGY 
(1996). 
 86 See generally Steve Rayner, Cultural Theory and Risk Analysis, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK 
83 (Sheldon Krimsky & Dominic Golding eds., 1992). 
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The two dimensions of worldview contemplated by “group-grid” were 
measured (in pre-screening surveys conducted several weeks in advance of 
the study) with two scales, “Hierarchy-Egalitarianism” (or simply, “Hierar-
chy”) and “Individualism-Communitarianism” (“Individualism”), used in 
previous studies of the cultural cognition of risk.87  As in previous studies, 
the scales were highly reliable measures of the latent disposition of sub-
jects toward those respective sets of worldviews (Individualism, α = 0.86; 
Hierarchy, α = 0.85).  To facilitate comparisons of subjects identified by 
their worldviews, we assigned subjects to cultural groups.  Based on the 
relationship of their scores to the median on each scale, we classified sub-
jects as either “Hierarchs” or “Egalitarians” and as either “Individualists” 
or “Communitarians.” 
5.  Hypotheses. — We formulated two major hypotheses.  One was that 
even if a majority of subjects agreed with the interpretation of the Supreme 
Court majority in Scott, reactions to the study tape would display signifi-
cant variation across persons of different characteristics.  The second major 
hypothesis was that these characteristics would be suggestive of the impact 
of culpable control, identity-protective, and cultural cognition.  
What these characteristics would be and how they would matter sup-
port a number of subhypotheses.  Some of the relevant characteristics, we 
surmised, would be sociodemographic.  We thus anticipated differences 
along dimensions such as age and community type (urban or nonurban).  
Such differences could be a consequence of the mundane contribution that 
experience in general makes to understanding events: witnessed events are, 
in effect, the equivalent of minor premises in a cognitive syllogism that 
generates conclusions only when combined with major premises drawn 
from experience.  Justice Stevens clearly had this point in mind when he 
argued that older people who learned to pass slow-moving automobiles on 
poorly lit, windy, two-lane country roads are likely to see Harris’s driving 
as creating less risk than those who grew up in an era of straight, brightly 
illuminated, four-lane highways.  One might expect differences in various 
other experientially relevant characteristics — such as education — to 
have some effect too. 
But other demographic characteristics, we expected, would also con-
tribute to differences in perception through mechanisms of motivated cog-
nition.  Race and gender, for example, are variously depicted both as 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 87 The scales consist of multiple “agree-disagree” items that express attitudes associated with one or 
another worldview (e.g., “[a] lot of problems in our society today come from the decline in the tradi-
tional family, where the man works and the woman stays home,” for hierarchy; “[w]e need to dramati-
cally reduce inequalities between the rich and the poor, whites and people of color, and men and 
women,” for egalitarianism; “[t]oo many people today expect society to do things for them that they 
should be doing for themselves,” for individualism; and “[i]t’s society’s responsibility to make sure eve-
ryone’s basic needs are met,” for communitarianism).  Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra 
note 59, at 504–05. 
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sources of group identity and as proxies for identities that consist in shared 
values.88  African Americans, we predicted, would be inclined to view the 
facts in a manner different from the Scott majority because they are more 
likely to have had negative experiences with police, to know other persons 
who have, and (as a result) to have friends and family members who be-
lieve the police are disposed to abuse their authority.89  Perceiving the 
facts in the video in a manner that suggests the police response was out of 
proportion to the risk created by Harris is congenial to this evaluation, and 
thus predicted by both the culpable-control and identity-protective cogni-
tion theories. 
We also predicted that gender would influence perceptions of the facts 
in the Scott tape.  Women, we surmised, were likely to view the facts in a 
manner relatively more favorable to Harris than were men.  The basis for 
this conjecture is that gender correlates with values — including cultural 
egalitarianism90 and ideological liberalism91 — that we have reason to 
think (as described below) would motivate cognition hostile to the behav-
ior by the police in this case. 
Other characteristics we expected to matter are explicitly connected to 
group commitments that figure in theories of motivated cognition.  These 
include political ideology and political party affiliation.  Understandings 
predominant among politically defined groups are among those to which 
individuals, for identity-protective reasons, tend to conform their own be-
liefs about policy-related and legally consequential facts.92  Cultural 
worldviews also matter from the standpoint of motivated cognition.  As 
noted, previous work suggests that cultural worldviews more powerfully 
explain differences of risk perception93 and legally consequential facts94 
than other characteristics.  Gender, race, income, and region of residence 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 88 See, e.g., W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1993) (1903) 
(offering classic statement of African American identity based on shared values); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN 
A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1993) (develop-
ing theory of gender identities focused on contrasting values). 
 89 See S.L. Browning et al., Race and Getting Hassled by the Police: A Research Note, 17(1) PO-
LICE STUD.: INT’L REV. OF POLICE DEV. 1, 1–11 (1994); Y.G. Hurst, J. Frank & S.L. Browning, The 
Attitudes of Juveniles Toward the Police: A Comparison of Black and White Youth, 23 POLICING: INT’L 
J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 37, 344–50 (2000). 
 90 See Melissa L. Finucane et al., Gender, Race, and Perceived Risk: The ‘White Male’ Effect, 2 
HEALTH, RISK & SOC’Y 159, 166–67 (2000). 
 91 See Richard A. Brody & Jennifer L. Lawless, Political Ideology in the United States: Conserva-
tism and Liberalism in the 1980s and 1990s, in CONSERVATIVE PARTIES AND RIGHT-WING POLITICS 
IN NORTH AMERICA: REAPING THE BENEFITS OF AN IDEOLOGICAL VICTORY? 53 (R.-O. Schultze, 
R. Sturm & D. Eberle eds., 2003). 
 92 See Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group Influence on Politi-
cal Beliefs, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808 (2003). 
 93 See generally Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 59. 
 94 See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, The Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense, 45 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1, 54–56 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1012967. 
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are likely proxies for the affinities constituted by such values.95  Moreover, 
they also furnish greater heuristic guidance than do political ideologies for 
persons who (like most Americans) have at best only modest interest in 
politics.96 
To focus our hypotheses reflecting these influences, we predicted that 
reactions to the Scott tape would vary across subjects divided into two 
prominent and recognizable cultural styles, which we designated “aleph” 
and “bet.”  Alephs hold conspicuously hierarchical and individualistic cul-
tural worldviews and (on most questions, at least) highly conservative po-
litical leanings.  Demographically, they are more likely to be affluent white 
males.97  Alephs also are more likely to live in the South or far West, 
where hierarchical and individualistic values predominate.98  Bets, in con-
trast, hold disproportionately egalitarian and communitarian views.  Their 
politics are more liberal and Democratic.  Relative to alephs, at least, bets 
will also be disproportionately female and African-American.  And they 
are more likely to live in the Northeast, where egalitarian and communi-
tarian cultural worldviews are relatively predominant.99 
We understand these groups to be recognizable contemporary examples 
of what Gusfield refers to as “status collectivities.”100  “Unlike groups 
such as religious and ethnic communities[,] they have no church, no politi-
cal unit, and no associational units which explicitly defend their interests,” 
but are nevertheless affiliated, in their own self-understandings and in the 
views of others, by largely convergent worldviews and by common com-
mitments to salient political agendas.101  “They possess subcultures” that 
play a conspicuous role in political conflict motivated by symbolic status 
competition.102  The issues that pit our aleph and bet styles against each 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 95 See RICHARD E. NISBETT & DOV COHEN, CULTURE OF HONOR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VIO-
LENCE IN THE SOUTH (1996) (using region as a proxy for shared values) [SWAT]; Kahan, Braman, 
Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 59, at 471 (suggesting that race and gender correlate with shared 
values). 
 96 See Aaron Wildavsky, Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of 
Preference Formation, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 3, 15–18 (1987); see also Kahan, Braman, Slovic, Gas-
til &Cohen, supra note 62, at 14–15. 
 97 Indeed, a discrete but sizable subset of white males who hold extremely hierarchical and indi-
vidualistic values drive the so-called “white male effect,” which refers to the disposition of white men 
to attribute less risk to various putatively dangerous activities than do women and minorities.  See gen-
erally Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 59. 
 98 See generally RAYMOND D. GASTIL, CULTURAL REGIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (1975) 
(providing basic cultural descriptions of geographic regions) [SWAT]; NISBETT & COHEN, supra note 
95 (contrasting the South with the North, West, and Midwest). 
 99 See generally Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 439–
42, 452–53, 462–67 (1999) (describing culturally grounded status conflict between these types on is-
sues such as the death penalty, gun control, and hate crimes). 
 100 GUSFIELD, supra note 17, at  21 (emphasis omitted). 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
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other range from affirmative action to gun control, from nuclear power to 
abortion, from the death penalty to gay rights.103 
As the Court’s analysis in Scott illustrates, someone called upon to 
evaluate a high-speed car chase must individuate and compare competing 
risks.  Which course of action by the police creates greater risk for the 
public — pursuing a driver who refuses to stop or letting him (and others 
in his situation) go?  What sorts of risk are worse — the continuous but 
indeterminately lethal ones to the public and the police associated with 
maintaining pursuit of a fleeing driver, or the sudden and more obviously 
lethal one to the driver associated with deliberately inducing his car to 
crash to a halt?  Aleph and bet subjects, we surmised, would form compet-
ing perceptions and evaluations relating to these matters. 
Aleph subjects, we hypothesized, would assess the risks in a manner 
consistent with that of the Scott majority.  Alephs morally disapprove of 
challenges to lawful authority and defiance of dominant norms.  These 
moral sensibilities make it congenial for them to believe, among other 
things, that illicit drug trafficking causes social harm and that excessive 
gun control renders law-abiding citizens vulnerable to predation.104  The 
same cultural and political sensibilities would likely trigger negative emo-
tions, including fear of and resentment toward Harris as a symbol of devi-
ance and law-breaking.  People who hold individualistic and hierarchic 
worldviews and associated political commitments also tend to approve of 
highly punitive responses to law-breaking, and as a result, to believe that 
such measures (including capital punishment) reduce the incidence of dan-
gerous or harmful behavior.105  This shared disposition, we surmised, 
would move subjects to approve of both the decision to pursue Harris at 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 103 See, e.g., id. at 140–41, 167–71 [SWAT]; KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF 
MOTHERHOOD 158–91 (1984) [SWAT]; J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313 
(1997) (gay rights and affirmative action); Kahan, supra note 99 (gun control and death penalty).  Like 
any scheme that purports to treat “culture” as an explanatory variable — particularly one amenable to 
measurement — ours necessarily reflects a highly simplified account of how shared values, experi-
ences, and patterns of living connect people.  Indeed, in referring to aleph and bet as cultural styles, we 
mean to emphasize the relatively modest depth of the affinities that connect individuals who adhere to 
them.  As is clearly implied in Gusfield’s account of status collectivities, aleph and bet comprise sub-
groups whose members, by virtue of more intimate ties, obviously possess distinct “cultures” in an even 
deeper sense.  We recognize, too, that there will be some issues that divide the subcommunities that 
tend to share either the aleph or bet styles.  See, e.g., Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra 
note 59, at 494–95 (discussing variation among white and African American egalitarians on issues in-
volving sexual mores).  Because the aleph and bet styles are salient and do figure in a familiar range of 
political conflicts, we see utility, both methodological and practical, in incorporating them into our 
analysis.  But we most certainly do not mean, in adopting this scheme, to make the patently absurd 
claim that American society consists of just two “cultures” or “cultural types.” 
 104 See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 149, 156–57 (2006) (describing theory of cultural cognition); see also Kahan, supra note 
19, at 131–36.  
 105 Cf. Kahan, supra note 19, at 122–23. 
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the outset and the decision to use deadly force to terminate the chase as 
risk-reducing on balance. 
We hypothesized that bet subjects would form the opposite set of reac-
tions.  Their egalitarian worldviews and left-leaning political sensibilities 
can be expected to incline bets to condemn authority figures for abuses of 
power much more readily than they condemn putative deviants for defying 
authority.106  Reinforced by their communitarian orientation, these same 
dispositions tend to make bet persons supportive of social welfare pro-
grams.107  Adopting factual beliefs congenial to these dispositions, such 
individuals tend to think that capital punishment and other punitive meas-
ures are not effective deterrents, and that permitting individuals to arm 
themselves with guns for self-protection, rather than making society safer, 
increases the risk of crime and accidents.108  In the same vein, we pre-
dicted that individuals who adhere to the bet style, when they viewed the 
Scott tape, would be angrier at the police, as symbols of overreaching au-
thority figures indifferent to the danger their use of coercion posed to the 
well-being of bystanders, not to mention Harris.  As a result, they would 
form the judgment that the decisions to chase Harris and to use deadly 
force to halt his flight did not reduce the net risk to society. 
D.  Results 
We present the results of our study in two steps.  First, we offer pre-
liminary analyses of the reactions of our subjects, overall and across dif-
ferent groups, to the Scott tape.  Second, we use statistical simulations to 
explore more systematically how individuals bearing combinations of 
characteristics that endow them with identities consistent with the aleph 
and bet cultural styles would view the facts the tape reveals. 
1.  Preliminary Analyses: Main Effects and Group Differences. — A 
preliminary examination of the data reveals two conclusions.  The first is 
that a relatively large majority formed perceptions of the Scott tape consis-
tent with that of the Supreme Court majority.  The second is that there are 
nevertheless marked differences in perceptions across identifiable sub-
groups.109 
As reflected in Figure 2 and Figure 3, overall perceptions of the key 
risk issues are highly consistent with those of the Court in Scott.  Solid 
majorities agreed either “strongly” or “moderately” that Harris’s driving 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 106 See sources cited supra note 66.  
 107 See Kahan, Braman, Slovic, Gastil &Cohen, supra note 62, at 15. 
 108 See Kahan, supra note 19, at 134–36. 
 109 To correct for underrepresentation of African Americans in the sample — and thus make the re-
sults more reflective of the likely views of the American public at large — the sample-wide summary 
statistics reported in Figure 2 through Figure 4 use population-weighted data. The group summary sta-
tistics reported in Table 1 use unweighted data, as do the multivariate regression analyses reflected in 
Table 2 and the statistical simulations presented infra section II.D.2, pp. XX–XX. 
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posed a deadly risk to the public, and additional subjects “slightly” agreed 
with those statements.  The subjects were more equivocal about the deci-
sion of the police to pursue Harris; 45% agreed (28% either “strongly” or 
“moderately”) that the chase was not worth the risk it posed to the public, 
and another 13% only “slightly” agreed that the chase was worth the risk.  
Still, 74% of the subjects judged Harris to be either “much more” or 
“slightly more” at fault for the risk to the public.110 
 
Figure 2.  Overall Perceptions of Risk 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 110 All percentages reported in the Figures and Tables and discussed in the text are rounded to the 
nearest percent. 
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Figure 3.  Overall Perceptions of Fault 
 
On the ultimate question (Figure 4), 74% agreed and 26% disagreed 
that the use of deadly force was warranted.  Reflecting some equivocation, 
however, nearly a quarter agreed or disagreed only slightly. 
 
Figure 4.  Deadly Force Was Justified  
in Response to Risk Harris Posed 
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 Table 1 illustrates the mass of individual variation tucked into the main 
effects illustrated in Figures 2 through 4.  That table reports group means 
on the individual response items and on the composite “Agree with Court” 
scale, which reflects the average of the response to all of the items.111  As 
predicted, African Americans took a significantly more pro-plaintiff stance 
across all items.  So did Democrats relative to Republicans, liberals rela-
tive to conservatives, and Egalitarians relative to Hierarchs.  Communi-
tarians were significantly more pro-plaintiff than Individualists for every 
item except risk to the public.  Women were also generally more pro-
plaintiff, although statistically the difference between the sexes was only 
marginally significant (p = 0.07 for “Agree with Court”; p = 0.09 for 
“Deadly Force Justified”). 
Table 1 also reveals some additional sources of variation.  Lower in-
come subjects were consistently more pro-plaintiff than were higher in-
come ones.  Nevertheless, less educated subjects were overall more pro-
defendant than were more educated subjects.  So, unexpectedly, were mar-
ried subjects. 
Older subjects were more inclined than younger ones to view the chase 
as not worth the risk it imposed on the public and the use of deadly force 
as not justified by the risk Harris posed.  However, contrary to Justice Ste-
vens’s hypothesis, elderly subjects did not perceive Harris’s driving to be 
less risky to either the public or the police. 
One might have surmised that urban dwellers would react differently 
from non-urban ones.  But our results detected no such effect. 
The impact of various individual characteristics relative to each other is 
reflected in the ordered logistic regression analyses reported in Table 2.  A 
multivariate regression model shows how much variance in any explana-
tory or “independent” variable (here race, gender, cultural worldview, and 
so forth) affects a quantity of interest (in our case, subjects’ answers to our 
response measures) when the impact of every other independent variable in 
the model is held constant.112  The models in Table 2 demonstrate that be-
ing African American (as opposed to white) exerts the largest effect across 
the various response measures.  How hierarchical or egalitarian subjects’ 
worldviews are also exerts a relatively large (and statistically significant) 
independent effect across all measures except the perceived risk of Harris’s 
driving to the public.  Being from the Northeast likewise had a relatively 
large (and statistically significant) effect across all but two of the meas-
ures.  Income had a significant but relatively small effect on three of the 
five measures as well. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 111 See supra TAN 84. 
 112 See JACOB COHEN ET AL., APPLIED MULTIPLE REGRESSION/CORRELATION ANALYSIS FOR 
THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 6–7 (3d ed. 2003). 
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Table 1.  Mean Responses 
Harris Posed Lethal Risk… 
 
Agree with 
Court 
Relative 
Culpability 
 
Chase Not 
Worth Risk 
 to Public to Police 
Deadly Force 
Justified 
Scale 1–6 1 (police) to 
5 (Harris) 
Å 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree) Æ 
Female 4.37 4.18 3.25 4.92 4.61 4.37 
Male 4.48 4.28 3.09 5.04 4.64 4.52 
Difference 0.11 0.10 0.16 0.12 0.03 0.15 
Black 3.70 3.57 3.87 4.42 3.83 3.51 
White 4.50 4.32 3.04 5.03 4.69 4.55 
Difference 0.80 0.75 0.83 0.61 0.86 1.04 
< $35,000/yr 4.23 4.05 3.35 4.66 4.53 4.25 
≥ $50,000/yr 4.52 4.30 3.09 5.15 4.69 4.54 
Difference 0.29 0.25 0.26 0.49 0.16 0.29 
≤ HS degree 4.50 4.30 3.17 5.02 4.75 4.61 
≥ BA degree 4.24 4.07 3.33 4.89 4.44 4.10 
Difference 0.26 0.23 0.16 0.13 0.31 0.51 
18-36 yrs old 4.44 4.19 2.96 4.89 4.57 4.50 
> 53 yrs old 4.28 4.17 3.46 4.84 4.58 4.28 
Difference 0.16 0.02 0.50 0.05 0.01 0.22 
Unmarried 4.24 4.10 3.28 4.72 4.47 4.22 
Married 4.58 4.34 3.08 5.20 4.77 4.64 
Difference 0.34 0.24 0.20 0.48 0.30 0.42 
Urban 4.44 4.23 3.02 4.92 4.61 4.48 
Nonurban 4.41 4.23 3.20 4.99 4.63 4.44 
Difference 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.07 0.02 0.04 
Northeast 4.23 4.13 3.37 4.78 4.40 4.20 
South or West 4.51 4.28 3.04 5.02 4.72 4.58 
Difference 0.28 0.15 0.33 0.24 0.32 0.38 
Democrats 4.16 4.00 3.55 4.85 4.44 4.07 
Republicans 4.72 4.51 2.70 5.14 4.84 4.82 
Difference 0.56 0.51 0.85 0.29 0.40 0.75 
Liberals 4.13 4.01 3.45 4.74 4.35 4.01 
Conservatives 4.67 4.44 2.87 5.15 4.85 4.80 
Difference 0.54 0.43 0.58 0.41 0.50 0.79 
Egalitarians 4.21 4.05 3.52 4.90 4.51 4.14 
Hierarchs 4.62 4.40 2.84 5.05 4.74 4.73 
Difference 0.41 0.35 0.68 0.15 0.23 0.59 
Communitarians 4.28 4.09 3.38 4.94 4.52 4.23 
Individualists 4.56 4.37 2.96 5.02 4.74 4.65 
Difference 0.28 0.28 0.42 0.08 0.22 0.42 
Bolded text indicates difference in means of paired groups significant at p ≤ 0.05. 
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Table 2.  Ordered Logistic Regression Models  
for Response Measures 
 Force Justified 
Lethal Risk to 
Public 
Lethal Risk to 
Police 
Chase Not 
Worth Risk Harris More at Fault 
Female 
 
-0.15 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(0.11) 
0.09 
(0.10) 
0.03 
(0.10) 
-0.08 
(0.12) 
Black (v. White) 
 
-0.66 
(0.22) 
-0.45 
(0.22) 
-0.60 
(0.22) 
0.46 
(0.22) 
-0.92 
(0.22) 
Other Minority (v. White) 
 
0.09 
(0.16) 
0.09 
(0.17) 
0.06 
(0.16) 
-0.03 
(0.16) 
-0.32 
(0.17) 
Age 
 
0.068 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.00) 
Household income 
 
0.03 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.01) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
Education 
 
-0.08 
(0.03) 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
-0.06 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
South (v. West) 
 
-0.02 
(0.14) 
0.08 
(0.14) 
-0.10 
(0.14) 
0.08 
(0.13) 
-0.21 
(0.16) 
Midwest (v. West) 
 
-0.21 
(0.15) 
0.06 
(0.15) 
-0.05 
(0.15) 
0.27 
(0.14) 
-0.20 
(0.17) 
Northeast (v. West) 
 
-0.33 
(0.15) 
-0.17 
(0.16) 
-0.25 
(0.15) 
0.30 
(0.15) 
-0.48 
(0.17) 
Urban (v. Nonurban) 
 
0.15 
(0.14) 
0.18 
(0.15) 
0.13 
(0.14) 
0.04 
(0.14) 
0.14 
(0.16) 
Married (v. Unmarried) 
 
0.27 
(0.11) 
0.32 
(0.12) 
0.16 
(0.11) 
-0.22 
(0.11) 
0.31 
(0.13) 
Parent (v. No children) 
 
-0.01 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(0.13) 
0.15 
(0.12) 
-0.07 
(0.12) 
0.17 
(0.14) 
Republican (v. Democrat) 
 
-0.01 
(0.13) 
-0.03 
(0.14) 
-0.04 
(0.13) 
-0.31 
(0.13) 
0.29 
(0.16) 
Independent (v. Democrat) 
 
-0.03 
(0.33) 
0.00 
(0.33) 
0.01 
(0.33) 
-0.03 
(0.31) 
0.15 
(0.38) 
Conservative 
 
0.05 
(0.05) 
0.09 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
Hierarchy 
 
0.46 
(0.08) 
0.10 
(0.08) 
0.16 
(0.08) 
-0.39 
(0.08) 
0.39 
(0.09) 
Individualism 
 
0.07 
(0.09) 
0.04 
(0.09) 
0.08 
(0.08) 
-0.08 
(0.08) 
0.07 
(0.10) 
R2 (McKelvey/Zavoina) 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.14 
log likelihood -2060.64 -1731.62 -2049.71 -2296.53 -1393.15 
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N = 1,347.  Dependent variables are responses to the indicated survey items.  Coefficients are ordered log-odds (ordered logits).  
Bolded coefficients are significant at p ≤ 0.05.  Parentheticals indicate standard errors. 
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Some characteristics of interest had no significant effect in the regres-
sion models.  These included gender (p = 0.15, for “Force Justified,” 
for example) and the relative individualistic or communitarian worldview 
of subjects (p = 0.45, for “Force Justified”), although those variables did 
have the expected signs.  This finding, of course, does not necessarily 
mean that these characteristics in fact have no influence on perceptions of 
the Scott tape.  They mean only that these characteristics do not have an 
influence considered apart from whatever effect they might be exerting 
jointly with other characteristics.113 
This picture is largely consistent with our hypotheses.  But it remains 
blurry.  Differences in means show that characteristics like race, gender, 
income, party affiliation, ideology, region of residence and cultural orienta-
tion all tend to matter.  But in the real world, peoples’ identities are usually 
not formed with reference only to one or another of these characteristics 
but with reference to packages of them that cohere with and reinforce one 
another in meaningful ways.  Far from eliminating this problem, multivari-
ate regression analysis exaggerates it by partialing out the joint effects of 
these characteristics and showing us only what each independently con-
tributes, thus obscuring the effects they will exert in tandem if they co-
vary.114  Our aleph and bet cultural styles form packages of related, and 
typically jointly occurring, characteristics and dispositions.  Clarifying the 
picture of what individuals holding these recognizable combinations of 
these characteristics are seeing in the Scott tape, then, requires a more 
powerful form of statistical analysis. 
2.  Clarifying the Data: Statistical Simulations. — (a)  Overview. — 
Clarify, a statistical application designed by Harvard political scientist 
Gary King, makes such analysis possible.  In conventional regression 
analysis, the influence of some set of explanatory variables on a dependent 
variable is expressed in a mathematical equation, the elements of which 
(regression coefficients, standard errors, p-values, and so forth) are re-
ported in a table (such as our Table 2).115  Clarify is intended to generate 
data analyses that simultaneously extract more information from a multi-
variate regression and present it more intelligibly.116  Using Clarify, an 
analyst specifies values for the independent variables that form a regres-
sion model.  The application then generates a predicted value for the de-
pendent variable through a statistical simulation that takes account of the 
model’s key parameters (including the standard errors for the regression 
coefficients).  It then repeats that process.  Then it repeats it again.  Then it 
repeats it again and again and again — as many times as directed by the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 113 See id. at 79. 
 114 See id. at 72, 78–79. 
 115 See generally id. 
 116 See Gary King, Michael Tomz & Jason Wittenberg, Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Im-
proving Interpretation and Presentation, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 347 (2000). 
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analyst (typically 1000 times, or enough to approximate the entire prob-
ability distribution for the dependent variable).  The resulting array of val-
ues for the dependent variable can then be analyzed with techniques that 
are statistically equivalent to those used in survey sampling to determine 
an average predicted value, plus a precisely calculated margin of error.117 
This form of analysis has various advantages over conventional regres-
sion analysis.  Conventional regression outputs (such as those reflected in 
Table 2) report the impact and statistical significance of each predictor or 
independent variable while controlling for the impact of every other 
one.118  As such, these outputs obscure the impact of theoretically relevant 
combinations of predictors (in our study, the various characteristics associ-
ated with the aleph and bet cultural styles).  That impact can easily be 
modeled through Clarify simulations, which permit one to compare how 
competing sets of predictors jointly affect a quantity of interest (such as 
responses to our various risk-perception measures).119  In addition, consis-
tent with the growing movement in the social sciences to make statistical 
analysis more accessible,120 the results of Clarify simulations — predicted 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 117 See id. at 349–51. 
 118 The concept of statistical significance is used to characterize a degree of confidence, as reflected 
in a p-value, that a predictor or independent variable (e.g., length of imprisonment) exerts an effect on a 
quantity of interest or dependent variable (e.g., the crime rate).  The p-value represents the probability 
that the difference between any observed effect and zero (or no effect) could have occurred by chance.  
Conventionally, an effect is considered statistically significant when p ≤ .05, meaning that the likeli-
hood that one might have observed the measured effect when the predictor in fact has no effect is less 
than 5%.  See generally Jacob Cohen, The Earth Is Round (P < .05), 49 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 997 
(1994).  Accordingly, the “nonsignficant” 0.15 p-value for Female in “Force Justified” indicates that 
there is a 15% chance that the observed effect of being female (controlling for all other influences) in 
reducing support for a pro-defendant outcome occurred by chance. 
 119 Independent-variable regression coefficients that are not statistically significant considered in 
isolation can still have a significant joint effect on the dependent variable when added together.  To cap-
ture that effect, nonsignificant predictors can be included, and set to whatever value is desired by the 
analyst, in a Clarify simulation.  See Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg & Gary King, Clarify: Software 
for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results, 8 J. STAT. SOFTWARE 1, 19 (2003).  “This is not 
problematic because the true quantities of interest are usually the predicted values, . . . not the coeffi-
cients themselves.”  Id.  The size of the standard error associated with any predictor (i.e., independent 
variable) included in the simulation will, of course, affect the precision of the predicted value of the 
quantity of interest (i.e., the dependent variable).  But because “even coefficients that are not statisti-
cally significant can provide important information,” it is more sensible “to focus on the confidence 
intervals Clarify reports for each quantity it computes than the standard errors of coefficients.”  Id.; see 
also ANDREW GELMAN & JENNIFER HILL, DATA ANALYSIS USING REGRESSION AND MULTI-
LEVEL/HIERARCHICAL MODELS 42, 69 (2007) (rejecting the position that statistically nonsignificant 
independent variables should be excluded from predictive models and identifying circumstances in 
which their inclusion “makes sense”)[ [SWAT]. 
 120 See, e.g., Andrew Gelman, Cristian Pasarica & Rahul Dodhia, Let’s Practice What We Preach: 
Turning Tables into Graphs, 56 AM. STAT. 121 (2002).  In the legal academy, Lee Epstein and her co-
authors have forcefully espoused the use of simulations and other forms of analysis that make the prac-
tical impact of multivariate regressions more accessible.  See Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin & Mat-
thew M. Schneider, On the Effective Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part I, 59 
VAND. L. REV. 1811 (2006); Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin & Christina L. Boyd, On the Effective 
Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part II, 60 VAND. L. REV. 801 (2007). 
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values for quantities of interest, subject to specified margins of error — 
can be graphically displayed in a manner that more clearly illustrates their 
real-world significance to real-world people than do regression coeffi-
cients, which lack intuitive meaning.121 
This form of analysis furnishes a perfect fit for our purposes.  We are 
interested in the perceptions of subcommunities of people holding combi-
nations of characteristics associated with the cultural styles  
that we have designated aleph and bet.  We can form reasonable statistical 
predictions of those perceptions by setting pertinent characteristics — gen-
der, race, region of residence, political ideology, party affiliation, and cul-
tural worldviews — to appropriate values in Clarify simulations. 
(b)  Ron, Linda, Bernie, and Pat. — We used Clarify to simulate the 
responses of our four hypothetical jurors, Ron, Linda, Bernie, and Pat.  
Ron was endowed with characteristics associated with the aleph cultural 
style.  He is a white male.  He is significantly more hierarchic and more 
individualistic (in the top quartile of the population for both characteris-
tics) than the average American.  He is a Republican and also extremely 
conservative.  He is fairly well-educated (a professional degree), and his 
household income is relatively high (over $175,000 per year).  He is from 
Arizona, or some other “Far West” state.  He is 46 years old (the popula-
tion mean, excluding those under 18).  Having no reason to believe that 
alephs differ from bets in their family status, we treated him as being as 
likely to be married and have children as the average American.122 
We set Linda’s characteristics to those of a recognizable bet.  She is an 
African-American female.  She is a liberal Democrat.  She lives in Penn-
sylvania, or another Northeastern state.  She is significantly more egalitar-
ian and more communitarian in her cultural outlooks than the population 
mean (in the top quartile for both).  She has an associate’s degree (or more 
precisely, some college education short of a B.A.) and makes a modest sal-
ary (around $25,000 per year) as an occupational therapist’s assistant.  We 
made no assumptions about her marital or family status. 
Bernie also fits the profile for a bet.  As a white male, his inclusion in 
the analysis helps to show how that particular cultural style is not confined 
to African Americans or women.  Because white bets tend to be more 
egalitarian in their attitudes toward sexual mores than do African American 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 121 See King, Tomz & Wittenberg, supra note 116, at 347 (explaining that Monte Carlo statistical 
simulations used in Clarify “extract . . . currently overlooked information” that “(1) convey[s] numeri-
cally precise estimates of the quantities of greatest substantive interest, (2) include[s] reasonable as-
sessments of uncertainty about those estimates, and (3) require[s] little specialized knowledge to under-
stand”); id. at 360. 
 122 As can be seen in Table 2, being married and having children tend to predict greater agreement 
with the Court majority.  Simulations suggest that, all else being equal, being married with children, as 
opposed to unmarried and childless, predicts about a 5% (± 1%) increase in the likelihood of agreement 
with the Court’s disposition on the “ultimate issue” — whether deadly force was justified in light of the 
risk that Harris posed. 
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ones,123 we assigned Bernie a more egalitarian worldview (in the top dec-
ile of the population) than Linda.  He is coded as a liberal Democrat.  As 
one would expect of a university professor, he is extremely well educated 
(he holds a doctorate degree), but makes a more modest salary (that of the 
population mean).  Like Linda, he lives in the Northeast.  In other respects 
(including marital status and parenthood), his characteristics were set to 
the population mean. 
Pat, of course, is an “average American.”  All of his/her values (includ-
ing gender) have been set to the American population mean.  Neither aleph 
nor bet (or perhaps a bit of both), he/she is included as a heuristic bench-
mark for assessing the views of the other representative members of our 
hypothetical venire. 
Using Clarify, we simulated the responses of Ron, Bernie, Linda, and 
Pat to the statements used to assess subjects’ perceptions of the Scott tape.  
The results appear in Figures 5 to 9 and Tables 3 to 7.124  In the cases of 
Ron, Linda, and Bernie, the percentages can be interpreted as reflecting ei-
ther the likelihood that a person with his or her characteristics would re-
spond to an item in the indicated manner or the percentage of people with 
his or her characteristics who would respond that way.  For Pat, the per-
centages can be understood to reflect either the likelihood that any person 
picked from the American population would respond as indicated or the 
percentage of persons in the general population who would so respond. 
Figure 5 and Table 3 furnish a vivid image of the deep dissensus that 
exists over whether the police should have engaged in a high-speed chase 
to apprehend Scott in the first place.  For Ron, this is a no-brainer: ap-
proximately three-quarters (76%, ± 2%) of the persons who share his de-
fining characteristics disagree — about two-thirds (66%, ± 3%) either 
moderately or strongly — with the proposition that the chase “wasn’t 
worth the danger to the public.”  Bernie and Linda, in contrast, generally 
agree with that same statement: 59% (± 3%) of the persons who share 
Linda’s characteristics either strongly or moderately agree the chase wasn’t 
worth the risk, and another considerable slice (18%, ± 4%) “slightly 
agree”; 73% (± 3%) of the persons who share Bernie’s characteristics 
agree (about half moderately or strongly) that the chase wasn’t worth it.  
Pat leans toward Ron but is equivocal: 55% (± 2%) of the members of the 
general population (according to the simulation) reject the claim that the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 123 See Ted G. Jelen & Clyde Wilcox, Causes and Consequences of Public Attitudes Toward Abor-
tion: A Review and Research Agenda, 56 POL. RES. Q. 489, 492 (2003) (finding that African Americans 
are more opposed to abortion than are whites); Gregory B. Lewis, Black-White Differences in Attitudes 
Toward Homosexuality and Gay Rights, 67 PUB. OPINION Q. 59, 63 (2003) (reviewing studies finding 
African Americans more opposed to homosexuality than whites controlling for other influences); see 
also Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 59, at 494–95 (finding that egalitarianism in-
fluences abortion risk perceptions less powerfully among African Americans than among whites). 
 124 The margins of error for all estimates reflect a 95% level of confidence. 
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chase wasn’t worth the risk to the public, but the median citizen is only 
“slightly” inclined toward that position. 
Figure 5.  Chase Not Worth the Risk 
 
Table 3.  Chase Not Worth the Risk 
 Ron Pat Bernie Linda  
Strongly Agree 5% ( ± 2%) 11% ( ± 2%) 31% ( ± 9%) 36% ( ± 12%) 
Moderately Agree 7% ( ± 3%) 14% ( ± 2%) 22% ( ± 4%) 23% ( ± 3%) 
Slightly Agree 12% ( ± 3%) 19% ( ± 2%) 20% ( ± 3%) 18% ( ± 4%) 
 
Slightly Disagree 10% ( ± 2%) 12% ( ± 2%) 9% ( ± 2%) 8% ( ± 3%) 
Moderately Disagree 21% ( ± 3%) 19% ( ± 2%) 10% ( ± 3%) 8% ( ± 4%) 
Strongly Disagree 45% (± 10%) 24% ( ± 2%) 9% ( ± 4%) 7% ( ± 4%) 
 
Figure 6 and Figure 7, along with Table 4 and Table 5, address the risk 
that Harris’s driving posed.  Much like the majority in Scott, Americans on 
average (represented by Pat) are strongly disposed to see Harris as a lethal 
menace: over 85% believe (more than 70% either moderately or strongly) 
that he posed a risk to the public, and about 80% believe (over 60% either 
moderately or strongly) that he posed a deadly risk to the police.  People 
who see the world the way Ron does hold these beliefs even more decid-
edly. 
Bernie and Linda believe Harris’s driving posed deadly risks too, but 
their views are somewhat more equivocal.  Fewer than one-half (44%, ± 
4%) of the persons who share Linda’s defining characteristics believe ei-
ther moderately or strongly that Harris posed a lethal danger to the public, 
and another quarter (23%, ± 3%) of those persons agree only “slightly” 
with that proposition.  Even fewer (37%, ± 5%) of the Lindas in American 
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society hold a firm conviction (“moderately” or “strongly agree”) that Har-
ris posed a lethal danger to the police.  The median person of Bernie’s 
characteristics likewise tends only slightly to agree that Harris posed a 
danger to the police.  There is a strong likelihood (75%, ± 4%) that some-
one with his characteristics will agree that Harris’s escapade posed a lethal 
threat to the public, although only about half (54%, ± 3%) would agree ei-
ther “moderately” or “strongly.” 
 
Figure 6.  Harris a Lethal Danger to the Public 
 
Table 4.  Harris a Lethal Danger to the Public 
 Ron Pat Bernie Linda  
Strongly Agree 67% ( ± 11%) 53% ( ± 3%) 30% ( ± 10%) 23% ( ± 10%) 
Moderately Agree 17% ( ± 5%) 22% ( ± 2%) 24% ( ± 3%) 21% ( ± 4%) 
Slightly Agree 9% ( ± 3%) 13% ( ± 2%) 21% ( ± 4%) 23% ( ± 3%) 
 
Slightly Disagree 2% ( ± 1%) 4% ( ± 1%) 7% ( ± 3%) 9% ( ± 3%) 
Moderately Disagree 3% ( ± 1%) 5% ( ± 1%) 10% ( ± 4%) 14% ( ± 5%) 
Strongly Disagree 2% ( ± 1%) 3% ( ± 1%) 7% ( ± 4%) 10% ( ± 6%) 
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Figure 7.  Harris a Lethal Danger to Police 
 
Table 5.  Harris a Lethal Danger to Police 
 Ron Pat Bernie Linda  
Strongly Agree 46% ( ± 11%) 37% ( ± 3%) 18% ( ± 7%) 17% ( ± 7%) 
Moderately Agree 25% ( ± 3%) 26% ( ± 2%) 21% ( ± 4%) 20% ( ± 5%) 
Slightly Agree 15% ( ± 4%) 18% ( ± 2%) 23% ( ± 3%) 23% ( ± 3%) 
 
Slightly Disagree 6% ( ± 2%) 8% ( ± 1%) 15% ( ± 3%) 15% ( ± 4%) 
Moderately Disagree 5% ( ± 2%) 6% ( ± 1%) 13% ( ± 5%) 14% ( ± 5%) 
Strongly Disagree 3% ( ± 1%) 4% ( ± 1%) 11% ( ± 5%) 12% ( ± 6%) 
  
The simulations also furnish a clear picture of the divisions hidden 
within the societal consensus over the “relative culpability” of Harris and 
the police (Figure 8 and Table 6).  The overwhelming majority of the per-
sons who hold Ron’s defining attributes feel Harris was either “much 
more” (88%, ± 6%) or “slightly more” (6%, ± 2%) at fault.  Pat, represent-
ing the average American, is almost as emphatic in his/her condemnation: 
there is a 79% (± 2%) chance, the simulation suggests, that a member of 
the general public will see Harris as more at fault, and only a 5% (± 1 %) 
chance that he/she will regard the police as more culpable. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.  Relative Culpability 
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Table 6.  Relative Culpability 
 Ron Pat Bernie Linda  
Harris Much More at 
Fault 
88% ( ± 6%) 64% ( ± 3%) 29% ( ± 11%) 16% ( ± 8%) 
Harris Slightly More 
at Fault 
6% ( ± 2%) 15% ( ± 2%) 18% ( ± 3%) 13% ( ± 4%) 
Equally at Fault 5% ( ± 2%) 15% ( ± 2%) 32% ( ± 5%) 35% ( ± 5%) 
Police Slightly More 
at Fault 
1% ( ± < 1%) 2% ( ± 1%) 8% ( ± 4%) 12% ( ± 4%) 
Police Much More at 
Fault 
1% ( ± < 1%) 3% ( ± 1%) 13% ( ± 6%) 24% ( ± 11%) 
 
Bernie and Linda, though, see matters differently.  About one-half 
(53%, ± 5%) of the people who share Bernie’s defining characteristics will 
say either that the parties were equally at fault or the police more at fault.  
At most a third (29%, ± 4%) of the persons who share Linda’s characteris-
tics will say that Harris was more at fault; a person who shares her charac-
teristics is at least five times more likely (36%, ± 4%) to say that the po-
lice were more at fault than is an average member of the general 
population (5%, ± 1%). 
Bernie and Linda also don’t agree with the Scott majority on the ulti-
mate issue (Figure 9 and Table 7).  Over three-fifths (65%, ± 2%) of the 
persons who share Linda’s characteristics disagree — about one-half either 
strongly or moderately — with the statement that “[t]he danger that Har-
ris’s driving posed to the police and the public justified Officer Scott’s de-
cision to end the chase in a way that put Harris’s own life in danger.”  
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Nearly three-fifths (58%, ± 2%) of the persons who hold Bernie’s charac-
teristics are also likely to believe that deadly force was unreasonable. 
 
Figure 9.  Deadly Force Termination Justified 
 
Table 7.  Deadly Force Termination Justified 
 Ron Pat Bernie Linda  
Strongly Agree 55% ( ± 11%) 37% ( ± 3%) 11% ( ± 5%) 9% ( ± 4%) 
Moderately Agree 23% ( ± 4%) 27% ( ± 2%) 16% ( ± 5%) 13% ( ± 5%) 
Slightly Agree 9% ( ± 3%) 14% ( ± 2%) 15% ( ± 3%) 14% ( ± 3%) 
 
Slightly Disagree 4% ( ± 2%) 7% ( ± 1%) 12% ( ± 2%) 11% ( ± 2%) 
Moderately Disagree 4% ( ± 2%) 8% ( ± 1%) 20% ( ± 4%) 21% ( ± 4%) 
Strongly Disagree 4% ( ± 1%) 7% ( ± 1%) 26% ( ± 9%) 33% ( ± 11%) 
  
 Pat does agree with the Scott majority, although not without a bit of 
equivocation.  There is a 64% (± 2%) chance that a person drawn ran-
domly from the population would either moderately or strongly agree that 
the police were justified in using deadly force.  There is, however, a 14% 
(± 2%) chance that he/she would be only “slightly” inclined to agree, and 
over a 20% chance that he/she would conclude upon watching the tape that 
use of deadly force was unreasonable. 
Ron again is emphatic.  Over 80% of the individuals who share his 
characteristics would find the police acted reasonably. 
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E.  Summary and Discussion 
The results of our study strongly confirmed our hypotheses.  With the 
exception of whether the police should have initiated a high-speed chase 
— a matter on which subjects sharply disagreed — reactions to the Scott 
tape reflect constrained dissensus.  A very sizable majority of our diverse, 
nationally representative sample agreed with the Scott majority that Har-
ris’s driving exposed the public and the police to lethal risks, that Harris 
was more at fault than the police for putting the public in danger, and that 
deadly force ultimately was reasonable to terminate the chase.  However, 
dissent from these perceptions and evaluations was not random; the minor-
ity of subjects who disagreed about the appropriateness of deadly force 
were connected by a core of identity-defining characteristics.  Indeed, so 
too were members of a minority who formed a view of the facts most un-
equivocally in line with those of the Scott majority. 
The relationship between these perceptions, on the one hand, and the 
relevant group identities, on the other, fits our hypothesis that reactions to 
the Scott tape would be shaped by various sources of value-motivated cog-
nition.  As we predicted, there were sharp differences of perception among 
persons bearing characteristics and commitments typical of two recogniz-
able cultural styles.  Individuals (particularly white males) who hold hier-
archical and individualist cultural worldviews, who are politically conser-
vative, who are affluent, and who reside in the West were likely to form 
significantly more pro-defendant risk perceptions.  Individuals who hold 
egalitarian and communitarian views, whose politics are liberal, who are 
well educated but likely less affluent, and whose ranks include dispropor-
tionately more African Americans and women, in contrast, were signifi-
cantly more likely to form pro-plaintiff views and to reject the conclusion 
that the police acted reasonably in using deadly force to terminate the 
chase.  The conspicuous competition between these recognizable cultural 
styles (or “status collectivities”125) on issues ranging from gun control to 
climate change, from abortion to the death penalty, attests to the power of 
the images reflected in the Scott tape to provoke perceptions protective of 
observers’ identities.126 
The results of the study also make clear that this form of identity-
protective cognition operates unevenly across the types of risk perceptions 
and evaluations that the Court’s own analysis in Scott reflects.  Persons 
subscribing to the bet cultural style disagreed with those subscribing to the 
aleph style about the risk posed by Harris’s driving, but they even more 
strongly disagreed about the apportionment of fault between Harris and the 
police for creating that risk.  The latter assessment, likely combined with a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 125 GUSFIELD, supra note 17, at 21 (emphasis omitted). 
 126 See supra TAN 100–103 & note 103 (describing relationship between cultural styles and deeper 
forms of cultural affinity).  
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similar discrepancy between these groups on whether the chase was worth 
the risk to the public to begin with, is apparently what explains the dis-
agreement over whether deadly force was justified.  The stake that those 
adhering to these styles have in protecting their respective identities, then, 
impels them into disagreement most strongly on whether the behavior of 
the police was risk-reducing or risk-enhancing on net, likely because that 
“fact” has the closest connection to whether we should view those in au-
thority with trust or suspicion. 
As we have discussed, the Court’s opinion admits of some ambiguity 
on exactly which issues the video was deemed dispositive.127  Were a case 
like Scott to be submitted to a jury, of course, the jury would be called 
upon to decide (in the form of a general verdict) all the issues that the 
Court identified as decisive to its analysis.  That is, in considering whether 
the use of deadly force to terminate the chase was reasonable, the jury 
would be required not only to gauge the degree of risk that the fleeing 
driver’s behavior imposed on the public and the police, but also to assess 
the “relative culpability” of the fleeing driver and the pursuing police offi-
cer for creating that risk.128 
As a result of the Court’s decision in Scott, though, in no case will a 
jury be permitted to decide any of those issues.  The Court’s decision ef-
fectively determined that, regardless of whatever other evidence might be 
presented in the case and whatever might transpire in the course of jury 
deliberations, there could be no room for “reasonable” disagreement on ei-
ther the magnitude of the risks involved in the case or the role of the po-
lice in reducing or exacerbating those risks. 
Our analysis suggests that this conclusion cannot be based on the 
ground that in fact no identifiable group of people would disagree with the 
Court on these matters after watching the Scott tape.  The Court’s decision 
can be justified only if the members of that group — those who do see 
something different from the Court majority — are necessarily “unreason-
able.”  We consider next whether such a conclusion can possibly be an ap-
propriate one for the law to make. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 127 See supra TAN 73–79. 
 128 See, e.g., COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, ELEVENTH CIR-
CUIT, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL CASES) 192–93 (2005) (“The third aspect of the Plain-
tiff’s [§ 1983, Fourth Amendment] claim is that excessive force was used by the Defendants in effect-
ing the Plaintiff’s arrest. . . . Whether a specific use of force is excessive or unreasonable turns on 
factors such as the severity of the crime, whether the suspect poses an immediate violent threat to oth-
ers, and whether the suspect is resisting or fleeing.  You must decide whether the force used in making 
an arrest was excessive or unreasonable on the basis of that degree of force that a reasonable and pru-
dent law enforcement officer would have applied in making the arrest under the same circumstances 
disclosed in this case.”). 
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III.  EVALUATING SCOTT 
Just as the Scott tape doesn’t “speak for itself” in a way that generates 
a single, indisputably correct answer to the factual issues posed by the 
case, so our study results don’t “speak for themselves” in a way that gen-
erates a single and indisputably correct answer to whether Scott was cor-
rectly decided.  Our results show that a substantial majority of the Ameri-
can public would likely see the key facts in the manner the Supreme Court 
majority did.  One could argue that this finding supports the Court’s con-
clusion that summary judgment was warranted.  We would not, because we 
think the shared values and other defining characteristics of the citizens 
who would see things differently make it inappropriate to dismiss their mi-
nority perspective as “unreasonable.”  But we realize full well that this po-
sition demands a reasoned defense, which we endeavor to supply in this 
Part.  We also identify alternative grounds on which the Court could have 
reached the same result in Scott without insisting that the videotape sup-
ported only one “reasonable” view of the facts. 
That insistence, we argue, is the only thing that is manifestly wrong 
about the decision.  The Court’s failure to recognize the culturally partial 
view of social reality that its conclusion embodies is symptomatic of a 
kind of cognitive bias that is endemic to legal and political decisionmaking 
and that needlessly magnifies cultural conflict over and discontent with the 
law. 
A.  Dissensus, Deliberation, and Legitimacy 
Our study suggests that a fairly sizable majority of Americans would 
agree after viewing the Scott tape that Harris’s driving created lethal risks 
to the public that warranted the police using deadly force to terminate the 
chase.  Such a finding is a necessary condition for concluding that the 
Court was correct to hold that the case should be decided summarily, but is 
it sufficient to justify that outcome? 
To answer the question requires a theoretical understanding of the 
properties of consensus that justify dispensing with civil jury decisionmak-
ing.129  How large, how intense, and how uniform across groups must such 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 129 We mean to address this issue not just as it relates to summary judgment but also to judgment for 
directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict as well.  Although variously worded under 
the Federal Rules, compare FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (standard for summary judgment), with FED. R. CIV. 
P. 50(a)(1) (standard for judgment as a matter of law), “the inquiry [for all these dispositions] is the 
same: whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or 
whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986); see also 9B CHARLES WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2532 (3d ed. 2008).  Nothing in our discussion, however, bears on 
summary disposition under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) or its state-law equivalents, which require a case to 
be dismissed for “failure to state a claim,” a disposition that goes to the adequacy of a plaintiff’s legal 
theory, not the strength of the plaintiff’s factual evidence. 
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agreement be for a court to say there is no point in obliging the large ma-
jority that sees things one way to deliberate with an identifiable minority 
that sees them differently?  We will offer a modest theoretical framework 
for answering that question — modest not necessarily because we have 
only a modest view of our own ability as theorists, but rather because we 
think nothing more than midlevel theorizing is needed to show that the 
necessary properties of consensus were lacking in Scott.130 
Presumably, a judge in a case like Scott should not base her decision to 
decide summarily on whether she thinks deliberation would increase the 
likelihood of a correct verdict enough to justify the cost of a jury trial.  
The reason is that verdict accuracy at a reasonable cost is not the point of 
jury decisionmaking.  If accuracy were the goal, it seems unlikely the law 
would use ordinary citizens to decide facts in a one-off fashion; it would 
almost certainly rely instead on professionals, whose expertise in “getting 
it right” would reflect both prior training and experience from repeated de-
cisionmaking.  Or in other words, the law would presumably use judges as 
factfinders.131  This is not to say that a theory of when jury decisionmak-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 130 Our theory is modest, too, in the sense that we do not take on the task of justifying the jury sys-
tem.  There is a rich literature on this subject, many contributions to which we draw on in the discus-
sion that follows.  The Court in Scott, of course, does not premise its decision on a radical repudiation 
of the jury and its conventional justifications.  Nevertheless, we can easily imagine that the Court was 
motivated to overstate the conclusiveness of the video on the key facts in the case by an unstated resis-
tance to jury trials generally.  See Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 
1907–14 (1998) (linking evolving Supreme Court summary judgment standards to growing acceptance 
of limiting access to jury trials); see also John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 522 (2007) (noting and criticizing the same trend).  But if so, the Court could have 
achieved the same result, without duplicity and without the cost to legitimacy we attribute to its reason-
ing, if it had based its decision on the grounds we discuss in section III.B. 
 131 The case for professionalization of factfinding has a long pedigree and is well developed.  See, 
e.g., ERWIN GRISWOLD, 1962–1963 HARVARD LAW SCHOOL DEAN’S REPORT 5–6 (“Why should 
anyone think that 12 persons brought in from the street, selected in various ways, for their lack of gen-
eral ability, should have any special capacity for deciding controversies between persons?”), quoted in 
HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 5 (1966).  See generally JOHN H. 
LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 318–31 (2003) (documenting the his-
torical antagonism between truth-seeking and the growing centrality of the jury in an adversary system 
of adjudication).  Although the comparison presents methodological challenges, the weight of the evi-
dence seems to suggest that judges generally render more accurate verdicts than juries.  See, e.g., Bruce 
D. Spencer, Estimating the Accuracy of Jury Verdicts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 305 (2007) (sur-
veying past studies and using innovative statistical methods to determine relative error rates of judges 
and juries based on rates of disagreement).  Some dispute this conclusion.  See, e.g., Robert J. Mac-
Coun, Epistemological Dilemmas in the Assessment of Legal Decisionmaking, 23 LAW & HUM. BE-
HAV. 723, 726 (1999).  However, the most common reply is to demur; the exclusive focus on accuracy 
fails to account for the myriad other political benefits associated with giving ordinary citizens a con-
spicuous and (arguably) meaningful voice in the administration of justice.  See, e.g., VALERIE P. HANS 
& NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 249 (1986) (arguing that the “political functions of the jury” 
deserve just as much consideration as its “fact-finding functions . . . in judging the jury’s role in soci-
ety”); Arie M. Rubenstein, Verdicts of Conscience: Nullification and the Modern Jury Trial, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 959, 983 (2006) (“[T]he jury is not at its core a mechanism for seeking truth; it is a 
tool for injecting democracy into the judicial process . . . .”); see also Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. 
Tyler, The Basis of Citizens’ Perceptions of the Criminal Jury: Procedural Fairness, Accuracy, and Ef-
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ing is worth the bother should be indifferent to accuracy, but it is to say 
such a theory must also be sensitive to other properties that a jury is 
uniquely or specially fitted to add to a (reasonably) accurate verdict. 
Those qualities are familiar and are reflected in standard accounts of 
the benefits of jury decisionmaking.  One is the simple ordinariness of ju-
rors’ perspectives.132  Facts “speak for themselves” only against the back-
ground of preexisting understandings of social reality that invest those 
facts with meaning.  Those understandings come from experiences and so-
cial influences that vary across groups of persons in systematic ways.  In 
particular, we can expect ordinary citizens to form different understandings 
of social reality from judges or other professional factfinders precisely be-
cause the process of legal and judicial professionalization involves experi-
ences and social influences alien to the rest of society.133  Maybe those 
special experiences and influences make the judges “smarter” and better 
equipped to give facts their proper meaning.  But since the judgments of 
fact that the law is basing its commands on are ones that govern the lives 
of ordinary citizens, the law would face a fairly obvious difficulty if its 
view of the “facts” didn’t take ordinary citizens’ understandings of reality 
into account. 
That difficulty would be of various forms, all of which relate, essen-
tially, to legitimacy.  “Legitimacy” in a descriptive sense refers to the po-
litical acceptability of law — its power to command voluntary compli-
ance.134  Citizens would be unlikely to assent to legal determinations that 
seem to reflect inaccurate judgments of fact — inaccurate because of their 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
ficiency, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333 (1988) (presenting experimental evidence that ordinary citizens 
prefer the jury on grounds of fairness to other modes of adjudication that appear to surpass it in accu-
racy). 
 132 See, e.g., JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DE-
MOCRACY 18 (Harvard Univ. Press 2000) (1994) (“[L]ocal knowledge . . . qualifies the juror[s] to un-
derstand the facts of the case and to pass judgment in ways that a stranger . . . could not. . . . [T]hey 
know the conscience of the community and can apply the law in ways that resonate with the commu-
nity’s moral values and common sense.”). 
 133 See, e.g., Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 222 (1862) (“[J]urors, from the mode of their selection, 
coming from the various classes and occupations of society, and conversant with the practical affairs of 
life, are, in my opinion, much better qualified to judge of the sufficiency and tendency of a given 
provocation, and much more likely to fix, with some degree of accuracy, the standard of what consti-
tutes the average of ordinary human nature, than the Judge whose habits and course of life give him 
much less experience of the workings of passion in the actual conflicts of life.”); HANS & VIDMAR, 
supra note 131, at 248 (“[T]he overwhelming majority of judges are still white males who come from a 
privileged sector of our society.  Often their views of the world reflect their backgrounds.  Some rather 
rigidly adhere to a narrow perspective of justice and fairness that is not consistent with that of the gen-
eral community.”). 
 134 This is the positive conception of legitimacy associated with the social sciences.  See generally 
C.K. Ansell, Legitimacy: Political, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAV-
IORAL SCIENCES 8704, 8704 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001). 
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lack of correspondence to ordinary citizens’, as opposed to specialized pro-
fessionals’, understandings of how the world works.135 
“Legitimacy” in its normative sense refers to qualities that make the 
law morally worthy of assent.136  Here too the jury plays a critical role.  
Broadly speaking, law has democratic legitimacy when the process of its 
formation is sufficiently connected to (determined by, solicitous of, re-
spectful toward) the will of those who are governed by it that we can im-
pute the law’s commands to them.137  Jury factfinding is such a process: 
the view of the facts reflected in the law can be morally imputed to those 
governed by the law when the law uses a factfinding process that is in-
formed by their view of social reality. 
Understandings of social reality vary, of course, not only between 
judges and citizens, but also across citizens of diverse experiences and so-
cial identities.  The diversity of citizens magnifies the contribution that 
jury factfinding makes to legitimacy in all these various senses. 
Just as citizens would be unlikely to assent to verdicts rendered by pro-
fessionals (say, judges) whose understandings of social reality were alien 
to theirs, so diverse citizens would be unlikely to assent to verdicts ren-
dered only by other citizens whose understandings of social reality were 
alien to theirs.138  By affording a factfinding role to citizens from diverse 
subcommunities, whose understandings of reality reflect experiences and 
social influences peculiar to those subcommunities, the jury contributes to 
the law’s legitimacy in the descriptive sense.139  To take an obvious exam-
ple, the Jim Crow exclusion of African Americans from juries140 led to a 
cynical and dispirited view of legal institutions in minority communities.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 135 See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 131, at 248–49 (arguing that the public will accept verdicts 
more readily when rendered by jury than by judge, particularly in a controversial matter); cf. Laurence 
H. Tribe, Trial By Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 
1376 (1971) (modes of adjudication that “fail[] to penetrate or convince the untutored contemporary 
intuition threaten to make the legal system seem even more alien and inhuman than it already does to 
distressingly many”). 
 136 See Ansell, supra note 134, at 8704 (describing the normative conception of “legitimacy” of con-
cern to political philosophers).  
 137 This is the unifying theme of a diverse collection of “social contract” theories of legitimacy.  See 
generally IAN SHAPIRO, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICS 109–15 (2003). 
 138 See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) (“The harm from discriminatory jury selec-
tion extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire commu-
nity.  Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confi-
dence in the fairness of our system of justice.”); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty  
Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1261, 1316–17 (2000) (stressing the role of representa-
tive juries in dissipating resistance to verdicts likely to be controversial among discrete  
subcommunities). 
 139 See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942) (“[T]he proper functioning of the jury 
system, and, indeed, our democracy itself, requires that the jury be a ‘body truly representative of the 
community,’ and not the organ of any special group or class.” (quoting Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 
130 (1940))). 
 140 See ABRAMSON, supra note 132, at 108–12. 
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Having no voice in that mode of the law’s production, those citizens natu-
rally distrusted the rules that came from the jury.141 
Likewise, by involving diverse citizens in factfinding, the jury contrib-
utes to the law’s democratic legitimacy in the moral sense.  The experience 
of interacting with others whose understandings of social reality differ 
from theirs — and thus learning that their own understandings, and hence 
their views of the facts, are partial — might cause jurors of diverse identi-
ties to converge on a common view of the facts, particularly where one 
side’s initial view is less intensely held than the other’s.142  Such conver-
gence would furnish assurance to the diverse citizens whom such jurors 
represent that the law embodies a view of the facts consistent with their 
shared experiences and defining commitments.  This assurance would in 
turn make the expectation of generalized obedience morally compelling. 
But probably even more important, jury deliberation can invest law 
with democratic legitimacy even when factual understandings born of di-
verse experiences and social influence persist.  Necessarily in that circum-
stance, subcommunities whose views of the facts are rejected by the law 
will not be able to see the law as reflecting their understanding of reality in 
substance.  Accordingly, they can be expected to see the law as theirs in 
the sense that morally warrants an expectation of assent only if the law 
arises from a process that shows due respect for their understanding of re-
ality and hence for their identities.143  Jury factfinding is a procedural 
strategy of that sort.  It assures that those who win in a contest between 
competing understandings were obliged to listen — under circumstances 
geared toward maximizing the prospects of changes in, and convergences 
of, perspectives — to those who have lost.  And in so doing, it enables the 
latter to assent without the experience of subjugation and domination that 
estranges them from the law.144 
This account brings into sharper focus the features that factual consen-
sus must have before it can justify dispensing with jury deliberation.  Pre-
cisely because juries can lend legitimacy to law by assuring minorities that 
their perspective is being respected, it surely isn’t enough that the facts in 
a particular case “speak for themselves” for a large majority.  If the minor-
ity’s view of the facts reflects the minority’s view of social reality, sum-
mary adjudication will deny the minority a basis to accept, or for the ma-
jority to demand that it accept, the law’s view of the facts as its own.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 141 See ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE SENATE 946–47 
(2002) (describing civil rights leaders’ resistance to jury trial enforcement of the 1957 Civil Rights Act 
because of distrust of unrepresentative juries). 
 142 See ABRAMSON, supra note 132, at 100–01. 
 143 Cf. HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 131, at 51, 248–49 (explaining that subcommunities aggrieved 
by controversial verdicts are more likely to see verdicts as fair if the jury contains their members). 
 144 See generally CHRISTOPHER J. ANDERSON, ANDRÉ BLAIS, SHAUN BOWLER, TODD DONO-
VAN & OLA LISTHAUG, LOSERS’ CONSENT: ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY (2005). 
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Before summary adjudication can be justified, then, the consensus that at-
tends a particular set of factual findings must be more than (or simply dif-
ferent from) “large.”  It must also be devoid of any partial understanding 
of social reality the endorsement of which by the law would alienate or 
stigmatize an identifiable subcommunity, whose perspective has been ex-
cluded from consideration.  Or, in a word, it must be mundane. 
Most — probably the overwhelming majority — of the cases that strike 
judges as presenting “no genuine issue as to any material fact”145 will pass 
this test.  Almost every time a judge declares no such issue to exist, 
whether in a complex commercial dispute or a routine slip-and-fall suit, 
she can be confident that some small fraction of potential jurors might well 
perceive the facts differently; statistical outliers are inevitable. But if these 
individuals are mere outliers — if they don’t share experiences and an 
identity that endow them with a distinctive view of reality, if the factual 
perceptions in question don’t arise from their defining group commitments 
— summary judgment will not convey the message of exclusion that dele-
gitimizes the law in the eyes of identifiable subcommunities. 
Scott, however, was not a case of that sort.  Our data suggest that the 
minority who would see things differently from the Court after watching 
the tape are not idiosyncratic statistical outliers; they are members of 
groups who share a distinctive understanding of social reality against 
which the facts of the case have a meaning different for them from what 
they have for the majority.  Moreover, the differences arise from a type of 
police-citizen encounter fraught with competing connotations in our soci-
ety: a civil liberties case.  Perhaps the disclosure of the experiences and 
social influences on which the minority’s understanding rests could change 
the majority’s view of social reality, and hence its view of the facts. 
But even if we assume — as we think is likely — that such exposure 
would not change the perceptions of the “vast majority,” it still does not 
follow that the Court was right to order that Scott be decided summarily.  
For it is exactly when the law is certain to endorse a factual position that 
aligns it with one contested view of how the world works rather than an-
other that the process of jury deliberation performs its greatest function in 
conserving democratic legitimacy in a diverse society.  If the law has not 
only rejected their view of social reality, but has refused even to permit the 
articulation of it in the process of the law’s determination of the facts, 
those who disagree lack any resources for understanding the law as theirs.  
Indeed, if the law has adopted procedures designed rigorously to insulate 
judicial determinations from the minority’s view of reality because a court 
deems that view to be one no “reasonable” citizen could possibly hold, 
members of that minority cannot understand (or be expected to understand) 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 145 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
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assent as anything other than acquiescence in their status as defeated and 
subjugated outsiders. 
Scott put identifiable subgroups of citizens in exactly that position.  
Even though constrained, the nature of the dissensus surrounding the facts 
revealed in the tape shows that Americans interpret those facts against the 
background of competing subcommunity understandings of social reality.  
Under these circumstances, ordering that the case be decided summarily 
based on the video was wrong precisely because doing so denied a dissent-
ing group of citizens the respect they were owed, and hence denied the law 
the legitimacy it needs, when the law adopts a view of the facts that di-
vides citizens on social, cultural, and political lines.  In so doing, the Scott 
majority transformed an inevitably partial view of social reality reflected in 
law into a needlessly partisan one. 
B.  How To Defend the Outcome in Scott: Reasons, Not Perceptions 
We have suggested that the Court in Scott was wrong to order summary 
judgment on the ground that it was entitled to “believe its own eyes” after 
watching the tape.  Its decision to privilege its view of a set of facts on 
which even a minority of persons who share a set of defining commit-
ments would disagree stigmatizes those citizens as outsiders and in so do-
ing delegitimizes the law. 
But nothing we have said in that regard implies, necessarily, that the 
result in Scott was incorrect.  We can think of at least three plausible alter-
native grounds for the decision.  We don’t know whether in the end any of 
them is persuasive (in part because we disagree among ourselves about the 
merits of at least one of them).  But we do believe that they all avoid the 
sort of criticism we have developed of the Court’s reasoning — or lack 
thereof — in the case. 
One such ground would have emphasized the unique approach that 
courts often take to factfinding in constitutional settings.146  So-called 
“constitutional facts,” unlike those decided in cases presenting no constitu-
tional issue, are often reviewed de novo in the Supreme Court.147  One 
reason for independent factfinding is to assure adequate enforcement of 
constitutional guarantees toward which there is majority antagonism that 
could seep into jury factfinding.148  Another is the importance of uniform-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 146 See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 247–54 
(1985) (history of constitutional fact review). 
 147 Id. at 261–62. 
 148 See, e.g., Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 276–77 (1971) (justifying judicial scrutiny of 
jury findings in cases involving the First Amendment because the jury itself is “unlikely to be neutral 
with respect to the content of speech and holds a real danger of becoming an instrument for the sup-
pression of those ‘vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks’ which must be pro-
tected if the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments are to prevail,” id. at 277 (citation 
omitted) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))). 
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ity and predictability of constitutional rules.149  This concern is particularly 
compelling where a court can perceive that enforcement of a constitutional 
norm will turn on a type of factual perception that a discrete subcommu-
nity does not share, for in that case summary adjudication is necessary to 
avoid inconsistent verdicts across jurisdictions and within particular juris-
dictions over time.150 
These concerns have had a conspicuous influence in Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence.  The Supreme Court has warned against “standards re-
quiring sensitive, case-by-case determinations of government need, lest 
every discretionary judgment in the field be converted into an occasion for 
constitutional review.”151  To avoid that, Fourth Amendment doctrine is re-
plete with rule-like presumptions of reasonableness for generically defined 
fact patterns (for example, the arrest and jailing of suspected misdemean-
ants without regard to their perceived dangerousness;152 “suspicionless” 
interviews of travelers at bus terminals;153 the stopping of a vehicle where 
probable cause exists to believe a traffic violation has taken place, without 
regard to officers’ subjective motives for stopping154) that spare police the 
uncertainty that would attend minute, case-specific factual inquiries, 
whether in the context of pretrial motions to exclude evidence from crimi-
nal prosecutions or of civil actions for damages.155 
The Court in Scott could easily have reversed on the basis of a pre-
sumption of reasonableness defended in this way.  Indeed, its decision 
ended by announcing a “rule” — “[a] police officer’s attempt to terminate 
a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent by-
standers does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 149 See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697–98 (1996) (“[D]e novo review [of facts that 
bear on Fourth Amendment determinations] tends to unify precedent and will come closer to providing 
law enforcement officers with a defined ‘set of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to 
reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest 
of law enforcement.’” (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981))). 
 150 These, in any case, are the conventional accounts of a certain type of aggressive judicial factfind-
ing in constitutional cases.  For an alternative account, see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping 
Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (2006).  
Goldberg argues that courts tend to disguise contestable normative judgments (sometimes ones that 
support repression of marginalized groups but also sometimes ones that resist such repression) as unas-
sailable “facts” in order to minimize political resistance to their decisions.  See id. at 1961; see also 
Alafair S. Burke, Equality, Objectivity, and Neutrality, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1043, 1048–51 (2005) (book 
review) (describing tension between empirical and normative strands of Fourth Amendment search ju-
risprudence); David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring the Empirical 
Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 544–45 (1991) (identifying nor-
mative commitments in factfinding). 
 151 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001).  
 152 See id. at 354. 
 153 See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). 
 154 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 155 Cf. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 110–11 (2004) (de-
scribing Atwater as a constitutional decision rule). 
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fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death”156 — that going forward 
could well shield from judicial scrutiny any police chase of a fleeing mo-
torist.157 
To be sure, any decision on this basis could have been criticized.  
Every bit as often as the Court has insisted on the importance of “bright 
line” rules, it has also recognized the need for flexible standards that can 
accommodate the fact sensitivity of Fourth Amendment reasonableness de-
terminations.158  Because such standards do enlarge the role for juries in 
civil damages cases, this branch of the doctrine is said to accord with 
“[t]he genius of the framers’ [understanding] . . . that juries of ordinary 
Americans can sometimes decide which intrusions are so unreasonable” as 
to violate the Fourth Amendment.159  The concern that jury factfinding 
might be corrupted by insufficient community support for the protections 
the Fourth Amendment guarantees is, at least sometimes, counteracted by 
the stake that ordinary citizens clearly have in “strik[ing] a sensible bal-
ance between liberty and order[:] If they unreasonably handcuff the cops, 
their community will suffer; and if they allow the cops to handcuff citizens 
unreasonably, they are likewise putting themselves at risk.”160  Finally, the 
prospect that jury decisionmaking might result in nonuniform verdicts, far 
from being decried as a vice, might be thought by some to be a virtue that 
perfects democratic rule by giving a persistent dissenting group “tempo-
rally or spatially restricted power to express their views.”161 
We take no position on the merits of judicial factfinding animated by 
concerns for uniform application of constitutional principles.  We note only 
that had the Court decided Scott on this ground, as it easily could have, it 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 156 Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1779 (2007). 
 157 But see id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“I do not read today’s decision as articulating a mechani-
cal, per se rule.  The inquiry described by the Court is situation specific.” (citations omitted)); id. at 
1780 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he video makes clear the highly fact-dependent nature of this consti-
tutional determination.”).  See generally TAN 73–79 (describing the Scott opinion’s ambiguity on the 
rule to be applied in car chase cases and on the identity of the issues subject to determination by the 
factfinder). 
 158 See Kathryn R. Urbonya, Rhetorically Reasonable Police Practices: Viewing the Supreme Court’s 
Multiple Discourse Paths, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1387, 1417 (2003) (“In addition to the Court’s con-
struction of broad, shifting reasonableness propositions, it has also inconsistently characterized the 
Fourth Amendment as requiring bright-line rules or case-by-case adjudication.”); see also Robbins v. 
California, 453 U.S. 420, 443 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (attacking one Fourth Amendment 
“bright line” rule against warrantless search of container during lawful search of interior of car: “Our 
entire profession is trained to attack ‘bright lines’ the way hounds attack foxes. Acceptance by the 
courts of arguments that one thing is the ‘functional equivalent’ of the other, for example, soon breaks 
down what might have been a bright line into a blurry impressionistic pattern.”), overruled by United 
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (adopting fact-sensitive standard for reviewing searches of 
containers in vehicles subject to search). 
 159 Akhil Reed Amar, An Unreasonable View of the 4th Amendment, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2001, at 
M1. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1756 (2005). 
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would have avoided stigmatizing an identifiable subcommunity’s view of 
social reality as too “unreasonable” to be given consideration in the ad-
ministration of justice.  No group of citizens’ views of the facts having 
been treated as privileged by the law, the members of subcommunities that 
had the minority view would have had no reason to see the law as less le-
gitimately binding on them than the members of the majority, who like-
wise are expected to assent to judicial determinations that reflect the spe-
cial competence of courts as expositors of the Constitution.162 
The same would have been true had the Court in Scott squarely based 
reversal on a second basis: the institutional advantage that courts have in 
determining the systemic consequences of particular legal rulings.  If the 
law is trying to figure out whether one man “slapped [another] . . . on the 
elbow” or “merely touched him,”163 “jurors, from the mode of their selec-
tion, coming from the various classes and occupations of society, and con-
versant with the practical affairs of life” have an advantage in determining 
all manner of historical fact over judges, “whose habits and course of life 
give [them] much less experience of the workings of passion in the actual 
conflicts of life.”164  But by the same token, precisely because of their dis-
tinctive “habits and course of life,” not to mention the special “mode of 
their selection,” judges are likely to gain certain insights into the workings 
of practical affairs of legal institutions.  Whereas most citizens, for exam-
ple, have only fleeting contact with law enforcement, judges have recur-
ring occasion to observe police officers and prosecutors at work.  They are 
thus, arguably, much more cognizant than are individual jurors of how 
damages verdicts — even intermittent ones — might change law enforce-
ment behavior.  Indeed, far from taking these more abstract and largely 
unobserved costs into effect, juries might be riveted by the vivid conse-
quences of policing gone bad in individual cases, and thus overestimate the 
likelihood of such misfortunes generally.165  Even if one does not believe 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 162 This is not to say that the minority — like the majority — will not be irritated by courts’ asser-
tion of power.  Even today, the (large) minority of the population who disagree with Roe and Casey 
protest its rule that courts, rather than criminal juries, weigh the social consequences and contested facts 
involved in the law of abortion.  That protest, in turn, excites political action.  See Robert Post & Reva 
Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 399 
(2007) (arguing that dissensus is “frequently expressed in legislation, which offers countless opportuni-
ties for judicial critics to interpose practical obstacles to the realization of constitutional norms ad-
vanced by a challenged decision”).  Here we invoke only the conventional argument that when courts 
exercise their constitutional interpretive power in the manner conventionally assumed to be appropriate, 
their decisions are legitimate in the moral sense. 
 163 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147 (1968). 
 164 Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 222 (1862). 
 165 This feature of jury decisionmaking reflects the unique vulnerability of juries to distorting influ-
ences such as vividness, representativeness bias, hindsight bias, and the like.  See, e.g., Dorothy K. 
Kagehiro, Ralph B. Taylor, William S. Laufer & Alan T. Harland, Hindsight Bias and Third-Party Con-
sentors to Warrantless Police Searches, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 305 (1991) (analyzing effects of 
hindsight bias on lay perceptions of third-party consent to warrantless searches); Michael J. Saks & 
Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW & 
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that these sorts of influences should disqualify  
ordinary citizens from central participation in the administration  
of justice generally, one might still conclude that they warrant constraining 
ordinary citizens’ role in deciding certain matters, which for that reason 
should be characterized as “matters of law” for courts to determine.166 
Elements of such reasoning do appear in the Court’s opinion in Scott.  
Rejecting the claim that the police should have discontinued the chase as a 
less drastic alternative to use of deadly force, the Court stated, “[i]t is ob-
vious the perverse incentives such a rule would create: Every fleeing mo-
torist would know that escape is within his grasp, if only he accelerates to 
90 miles per hour, crosses the double-yellow line a few times, and runs a 
few red lights.”167  Since such perverse incentives would be generated by 
any jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff in a case involving a high-speed 
chase, the Court could have treated this reasoning as dispositive of the case 
as a matter of law wholly apart from whatever facts any “reasonable juror” 
might have seen in the tape. 
Again, we are not necessarily arguing that this would have been a per-
suasive basis for reversing.  Indeed, one could argue that judges are the 
ones who lack a realistic understanding of the costs and benefits of various 
policing techniques,168 particularly in communities whose members have 
considerable experience with the coercive incidences of them.169  More-
over, judges may be subject to capture by the authorities they are supposed 
to regulate, especially in state systems, where electoral endorsement by the 
police and the district attorney tend to be necessary in judicial elections.  It 
is also a bit odd for members of the Supreme Court — who encounter the 
workings of criminal law-enforcement from a remote, law-bookish per-
spective only — to think they have a better grasp of the consequences of 
Fourth Amendment rulings than do individual district court judges, whose 
dockets are likely to be dominated by criminal matters.  Nevertheless, as a 
ground for decision firmly established in familiar understandings of the in-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
SOC’Y REV. 123 (1981) (analyzing cognitive biases affecting lay juror interpretation of quantitative 
evidence); cf. Catherine T. Struve, Constitutional Decision Rules for Juries, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 659, 680–81 (2006) (arguing that issues on which Fourth Amendment excessive force claims turn 
should be allocated between judge and jury with such considerations in mind). 
 166 Cf. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How 
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007) (noting that in performing certain tasks structured 
to involve legal reasoning, judges appear to display relatively greater resistance to biases than lay per-
sons). 
 167 Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1779 (2007). 
 168 See Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the Character of the 
Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99, 137 n.114 (1999) (suggesting 
“availability” heuristic distorts judicial perception of likelihood of accuracy of police investigatory 
judgments because courts see “primarily . . . criminal cases in which police intuition proved accurate”). 
 169 See generally Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 
GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998) (defending deference to inner-city communities’ balancing of order and liberty 
struck by policing techniques that affect them). 
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stitutional competence of courts in general, had the Court relied entirely on 
the bad consequences of permitting any jury to award damages in a high-
speed police chase, it would have avoided gratuitously insulting any class 
of citizens in particular. 
Finally, the Court in Scott could have reversed on the ground that de-
mocratic political checks adequately assure the “reasonableness” of high-
speed police chases.  Like many other bodies of constitutional doctrine,170 
the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is highly sensitive to the 
generality of coercive state behavior.  In a case like Garner — in which 
the police shot a criminal suspect who was fleeing them on foot — coer-
cion is concentrated on a single individual whose well-being is likely to be 
a matter of indifference (at best)171 to the general public.  Popularly ac-
countable officials thus have little incentive to police the police in this con-
text to assure the toll police behavior exacts on individual liberty is com-
pensated for by its contribution to public order — the test for 
“reasonableness” under the Fourth Amendment.172  Accordingly, courts 
regulate the exercise of police power in this and like circumstances 
through strict enforcement of judicially defined reasonableness tests. 
Many other types of law enforcement authority, however, do impose a 
burden on citizens generally, either directly or indirectly through their im-
pact on parties whose interests citizens share.  Examples include sobri-
ety173 and other types of vehicle checkpoints,174 which burden ordinary 
citizens as drivers; random drug tests of high school students,175 which 
burden ordinary citizens as parents; and warrantless “administrative” 
searches of businesses,176 which burden citizens as consumers.  Precisely 
because the coercive effects of such exercises of law enforcement authority 
are meaningfully visited on the citizenry at large, their approval by politi-
cally accountable actors furnishes compelling evidence that these policies 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 170 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST : A THEORY OF JUDICIAL RE-
VIEW (1980). 
 171 Although the Supreme Court famously avoids referring to this aspect of the case, the defendant in 
Garner was an African-American youth, and the challenge to the state common law authorization of the 
use of deadly force against nondeadly fleeing felons was based primarily on the racially disparate im-
pact of this law enforcement technique.  See Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 333, 339–40 (1998).  
 172 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (stating that “the standard of reason-
ableness” under the Fourth Amendment turns on a “balanc[ing]” of the affected “individual’s legitimate 
expectations of privacy and personal security” and the government’s interest in securing “public or-
der”). 
 173 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
 174 See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004) (upholding checkpoints aimed at apprehending hit-
and-run drivers). 
 175 See Bd. of Educ. of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (upholding drug testing 
program for students involved in extracurricular activities generally); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 
515 U.S. 646, 650 (1995) (upholding drug testing program for high school athletes). 
 176 See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987). 
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strike a reasonable balance between liberty and order.177  Judicially en-
forced rules are thus not necessary in this setting to test whether such ex-
ercises of power are “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.178 
This reasoning could well have been adopted in Scott.179  When police 
decide to initiate a high-speed chase — and to persist in it until they man-
age to force the suspect to lose control of his vehicle and crash — they 
create immense risk for members of the public generally.  Indeed, innocent 
bystanders are often injured when struck either by the fleeing motorist or 
police pursuers.180  Accordingly, even if she is indifferent (or hostile) to 
the interests of the fleeing suspect, the ordinary citizen as driver or pedes-
trian clearly has a stake in the police not resorting to this potentially 
deadly seizure technique unless doing so generates commensurate benefits 
for public order.  Because the ordinary citizen has such a stake, politically 
accountable officials have an incentive to police their own police to make 
sure they don’t engage in high-speed chases without good reason.  Indeed, 
hundreds of municipalities — responsive to the opinions of citizens like 
Bernie and Linda — have already adopted regulations that place severe re-
strictions on the use of high-speed chases and prohibit them from being 
used  
to apprehend drivers who resist being pulled over for minor traffic  
infractions.181 
Once more, we are not necessarily arguing that the Court should have 
identified the adequacy of political checks as grounds for summarily decid-
ing Scott.  But had it done so, far from sending a message of exclusion to 
citizens like Bernie and Linda, it would have been conveying in the most 
emphatic terms available to a court that the decision was to be made 
through a process — the enactment of law by democratically accountable 
representatives — in which the voices of all must theoretically be heard.182 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 177 See Kahan & Meares, supra note 169, at 1173–74. 
 178 See, e.g., Lidster, 540 U.S. at 421, 426 (explaining no “rule is needed” to assure roadside check-
points are “reasonable, [and] hence, constitutional” because “practical considerations — namely, limited 
police resources and community hostility to related traffic tieups” — can be expected to constrain the 
unwarranted use of this technique); Earls, 536 U.S. at 841 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing as evidence 
of reasonableness of drug-testing policy that a “democratic, participatory process” in which parents 
were involved “revealed little, if any, objection”); Vernonia School Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 665 (citing 
“unanimous approval” of parents at public meeting as evidence that drug testing does not unreasonably 
burden privacy of students).  
 179 It was in fact a disposition urged on the Court by an amicus group consisting of various munici-
pal and state governments and officials.  See Brief of the National Ass’n of Counties, et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9–17, Scott v. Harris, No. 05-1631.  This group was represented by one 
of the authors (Kahan) in his capacity as an instructor in the Yale Law School Supreme Court Clinic. 
 180 See id. at 12 & n.9. 
 181 See id. at 15. 
 182 See generally JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION (1999) [hereinafter WAL-
DRON, DIGNITY] (developing theory of how legislation recognizes dignity of the minority at the same 
time it recognizes authority of the majority); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 108–13 
(1999) (same). 
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C.  Cognitive Illiberalism and Judicial Humility 
We have come not to bury Scott but rather to identify the lessons that 
can be gleaned from it.  We have argued that members of the Court major-
ity were mistaken merely to “trust their own eyes” in viewing the Scott 
tape.  But the upshot can’t be that judges should never trust their own per-
ceptions of the facts when determining whether to resolve cases summarily 
— instead sending every case, no matter how flimsy or outright specious 
the factual disputes are, to juries.  Scott, we’ve argued, presents certain 
special features that made it inappropriate for the Court to treat it as war-
ranting summary decision even though the case would have presented a 
“genuine issue [of] material fact”183 only for an admitted minority of citi-
zens.  The task, then, is to try to figure out what sorts of cues judges can 
look for when they are trying to distinguish the relatively few cases that 
possess these features from the vast run of cases, including ones that rely 
on video and like forms of demonstrative evidence, that are otherwise fit 
for summary adjudication.  Performing this task, we suggest, requires iden-
tifying and taking effective steps to neutralize a set of interlocking social-
psychological dynamics that are likely to distort judicial decisionmaking 
on factual issues that divide competing cultural and social groups. 
The foundation of such distortion is naïve realism.184  Social psycholo-
gists use this term to refer to an asymmetry in the ability of most people to 
identify the effects of value-motivated cognition.  We are good at detecting 
when those who disagree with us about matters of fact are influenced by 
the congeniality of their beliefs to their defining group commitments.185  
That’s the realism part.  The naïve part is that we are correspondingly poor 
at identifying how the motivation to form beliefs congenial to our own 
group commitments operates in us.186 
In the realm of legal and political life, this tendency has pernicious 
consequences.  Many important policies turn on issues of disputed fact, or 
predictions based on fact: Does the death penalty deter murder?  Does 
global warming exist, is it caused by humans, and does it pose significant 
economic and environmental threats?  Does the minimum wage make 
working-class people better off or worse?  Will vaccinating school-age 
girls against the HPV virus cause them to engage in promiscuous, unpro-
tected sex and thus increase the incidence of teen pregnancy and HIV in-
fection?  Because they are not generally aware of their own disposition to 
form factual beliefs that cohere with their cultural commitments, legisla-
tors, policy analysts, and ordinary citizens manifest little uncertainty about 
their answers to these questions.  But much worse, because they can see 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 183 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
 184 See Robinson, Keltner, Ward & Ross, supra note 18, at 404–05. 
 185 Id. at 405. 
 186 Id.  
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full well the influence that cultural predispositions have on those who dis-
agree with them, participants in policy debates often adopt a dismissive 
and even contemptuous posture toward their opponents’ beliefs.  This atti-
tude in turn provokes resentment on the part of their opponents, who, as a 
result of naïve realism, bridle at the suggestion that they are conforming 
their factual beliefs to their values yet see exactly that sort of process go-
ing on in the minds of their (annoyingly smug, it seems) antagonists.  They 
naturally proclaim as much — initiating an escalating cycle of recrimina-
tion and distrust.187 
The result is a state of cognitive illiberalism.  The vast majority of citi-
zens in our society do not desire to impose their values on others.  They 
accept the basic liberal premise that law and policy should be confined to 
attainment of secular goods — security, health, prosperity — that are fully 
accessible to persons of all cultural outlooks.188  But because the factual 
beliefs they form about the sorts of behavior that threaten those goods are 
(subconsciously) motivated by their cultural appraisals of those activities, 
such citizens naturally divide into opposing cultural factions on the poli-
cies the law should pursue to achieve their common welfare.  Locked into 
a state of cyclical recrimination, moreover, members of these factions be-
come perfectly (painfully) aware of this alignment between competing fac-
tual beliefs and opposing cultural identities.  In such a climate, challenges 
to group-dominant beliefs become indistinguishable from indictments of 
the integrity and competence of the groups’ members.  Opposing groups 
find themselves engaged in relentless, symbolic status competition — not 
over whose partisan view of the good the law will endorse, but over whose 
culturally partisan view of the facts it will credit.189 
We argue that the decision in Scott reflects and reinforces these dynam-
ics.  The Justices in the majority couldn’t literally have perceived that no 
one could see the facts on the tape differently from how they saw them.  
The evidence that some citizens might was staring them, literally, in the 
face: Justice Stevens, who presumably indicated even in conference that he 
was not of the view that the case was fit for summary disposition.  Even 
apart from Justice Stevens’s interpretation of the tape, though, the case was 
replete with cues that a decision on the grounds the Court settled on would 
provoke at least some generalized societal dissent.  It involved a coercive, 
near-deadly encounter between police and a citizen, always a potentially 
divisive matter in our society; numerous public interest groups had filed 
briefs in support of the respondent; and coverage of the case in the media, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 187 See Kahan, supra note 19, at 130–42 (tracking this process in political debates concerning sod-
omy, drugs, guns, smoking, and nuclear energy and global warming). 
 188 See generally MORRIS P. FIORINA WITH SAMUEL J. ABRAMS & JEREMY C. POPE, CULTURE 
WAR? THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA (2006) (canvassing evidence that the vast majority of 
the public cares more about material welfare issues than symbolic moral ones). 
 189 See generally Kahan, supra note 19. 
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too, suggested the decision would be controversial.  Consistent with naïve 
realism, the Court might well have concluded, hardly without reason, that 
any dissatisfaction various social groups would have with reversal would 
reflect the motivating impact of these citizens’ group commitments on their 
perceptions of the facts as well as their interpretation of the relevant legal 
precedents.  But what likely did not occur to the Justices in the majority 
was the degree to which their own perceptions (not to mention the percep-
tions of those who would agree with them upon watching the tape) would 
be just as bound up with cultural, ideological, and other commitments that 
disposed them to see the facts in a particular way.190 
The basis on which the Court justified its decision exhibits the ten-
dency of naïve realism toward culturally grounded recrimination and dis-
trust.  By declaring, in particular, that “no reasonable juror” could have 
formed beliefs contrary to the Court’s own, the Court inevitably called into 
question the integrity, intelligence, and competence of identifiable sub-
communities whose members in fact held those dissenting beliefs.  Those 
individuals, the Court should have foreseen, would in turn react with re-
sentment and (not insupportable) suspicion that members of the Court ma-
jority (and any who agreed with them) were motivated by their values to 
declare their perceptions alone to be “reasonable.”  As in other settings, 
then, in which the law picks sides in factual disputes that arise from cul-
turally conflicting worldviews, the decision itself could well have been ex-
pected to deepen illiberal status competition.191 
We believe this sort of outcome is avoidable.  Judges can but needn’t 
inevitably compound the dynamics of cognitive illiberalism.  Indeed, we 
believe they are uniquely equipped to help counteract those dynamics.  
The remedy is a form of judicial humility. 
In a recent article, Professor Cass Sunstein argues that an appropriate 
posture of humility counsels courts to be sensitive to community out-
rage.192  Judges, he notes, are boundedly rational, just like the rest of us, 
and as a result are prone to err both about the legal correctness of their de-
cisions and about the practical consequences of them.  One remedy, Sun-
stein argues, is a sensitivity to anticipated community outrage convention-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 190 Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 116 (2008) (observing that when judges are 
confronted with ambiguous facts that touch on charged issues they, like everyone else, “fall back on 
their intuitions” and display “[t]he kind of telescoped reasoning . . . called . . . ‘cultural cognition’”). 
 191 See generally Goldberg, supra note 150 (arguing that judicial factfinding responds to and rein-
forces cultural conflict); Kahan & Braman, supra note 94 (making this point about factual determina-
tions in controversial self-defense cases).  It is precisely because this aspect of Scott generalizes that the 
decision furnishes a constructive target for criticism on this basis.  Our point is not that Scott, consid-
ered by itself, deprives the law generally of legitimacy; obviously, the degree to which any particular 
display of cultural partisanship undermines civic identification with the law will be negligible.  Our 
point is that the case displays a form of bias that is in fact pervasive in our legal and political system 
and that as a whole is responsible for illiberal conflict.  See generally Kahan, supra note 19. 
 192 See Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 155 (2007). 
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ally thought to be antithetical to the judicial mindset.193  Humility — born 
of mindfulness of the limits of her own reasoning power — counsels the 
judge to treat the foreseeability of such outrage as a cue that maybe she is 
in fact wrong; it gives her, at a minimum, reason to rethink, and might, in 
some cases, furnish her a reason to decide a case in a manner contrary to 
her own inclinations.194  Sunstein suggests that outrage normally serves as 
a corrective heuristic of this sort when it is experienced by a large major-
ity, unless the judge perceives that an outraged minority has some special 
expertise or might be specially situated to resist the decision in a way that 
has bad consequences for society overall. 
But our argument shows how humility might enlarge the circumstances 
in which judges should attend to the potential for minority outrage.  
Judges, like the rest of us, lack full insight into how the mechanisms of 
value-motivated cognition shape their and others’ perceptions of particular 
facts.  But just like the rest of us, they are perfectly capable of understand-
ing that these dynamics exist and can  
adversely affect the quality of their decisionmaking.  One way to compen-
sate for the partiality, and the incipient partisanship, of their own factual 
perceptions is to attend to cues that a cultural subcommunity will react 
with outrage should judges privilege their own factual perceptions.  For in 
that situation, the anticipated reaction will furnish judges with evidence 
that committing the law to a particular fact  
risks creating the delegitimizing forms of cultural conflict that we have de-
scribed. 
More concretely, we recommend that a judge engage in a sort of men-
tal double check when ruling on a motion that would result in summary 
adjudication.  Again, almost any time a judge does conclude that there is 
no genuine dispute about some set of material facts, she will be able to an-
ticipate that some small percentage of actual jurors would nevertheless 
dispute them.  Before concluding, then, that no reasonable juror could find 
such facts, the judge should try to imagine who those potential jurors 
might be.  If, as will usually be true, she cannot identify them, or can con-
jure only the random faces of imaginary statistical outliers, she should pro-
ceed to decide the case summarily.  But if instead she can form a concrete 
picture of the dissenting jurors, and they are people who bear recognizable 
identity-defining characteristics — demographic, cultural, political, or oth-
erwise — she should stop and think hard.  Due humility obliges her to 
consider whether privileging her own view of the facts risks conveying a 
denigrating and exclusionary message to members of such subcommuni-
ties.  If it does, she should choose a different path. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 193 See id. at 164.   
 194 See id. at 175–78. 
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There is nothing radical in our suggestion that a judge temper her deci-
sionmaking with a prudential sensibility of this sort.  On the contrary, that 
judges can and should exercise this form of discernment is the premise of 
Professor Alexander Bickel’s celebrated defense of the “passive virtues,” 
which counsels a rich array of avoidance techniques to steer the law clear 
of legitimacy-enervating gestures of partisanship.195  All we are doing is 
calling attention to another legitimacy-depleting gesture — the endorse-
ment of culturally partisan views of facts — that courts should use this 
sensibility to avoid. 
But will judges inevitably succumb to the subconscious influence of 
their cultural predispositions even as they exercise the particular corrective 
we have urged to avoid cognitively illiberal judicial factfinding?  
Maybe.196  Research is growing, however, on the power of the judicial role 
to impart habits of mind that counteract certain types of biases,197 includ-
ing ones that distort moral reasoning.198  There is certainly no reason, then, 
to dismiss out of hand the possibility that the device we are recommending 
— that judges pause to consider whether what strikes them as an “obvi-
ous” matter of fact might in fact be viewed otherwise by a discrete and 
identifiable subcommunity199 — is one that would function as an effective 
debiasing strategy for cognitive illiberalism.  Indeed, the very gesture of 
attempting to do so in good faith would go a long way to counteracting the 
message of exclusion associated with a decision like Scott.200 
Connecting our proposal to Bickel’s prudential minimalism makes 
more concrete the limited scope of our caution about summary adjudica-
tion.  Courts are rarely impelled to adopt the self-abnegating style associ-
ated with the passive virtues.  As we have emphasized, the Court certainly 
could have foreseen, because of the contentious symbolism of the case, 
that its view of the facts in Scott would be disputed by persons of a par-
ticular cultural outlook.  We can certainly think of other kinds of cases too 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 195 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 111–98 (Vail-Ballor Press 2d ed. 1986) (1962); see also  
Sunstein, supra note 192, at 168–75 (grounding his defense of “humility” in the theory of passive vir-
tues). 
 196 Cf. Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 32, 81–82 (2005) (“Reading Bickel’s [The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive 
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961)], one realizes that he had definite ideas about where the public 
policy of the United States should be moving and that these ideas were his ‘principles.’”). 
 197 See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 166. 
 198 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, A Thumb on 
the Scale: Investigating Implicit Bias on the Bench, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 
2009). 
 199 Cf. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Indicate They May Uphold Voter ID Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 
2008, at A1 (reporting Justice Roberts’ skepticism toward the claim that obtaining official identification 
at the county seat as a prerequisite to voting is burdensome and reply of counsel that “[i]f you’re indi-
gent, [the 17-mile bus trip from urban Gary to the county seat] is a significant burden” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).  
 200 We are grateful to Judge Richard Posner for focusing our attention on this issue. 
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— ones involving gun control,201 say, or environmental regulation202 — 
that courts could readily anticipate would result in culturally polarized un-
derstandings of fact.  But those cases are far and away the exception and 
not the rule in ordinary litigation.  Consequently, the prudential brake we 
are urging on summary adjudication is one courts should rarely feel con-
strained to apply in cases that otherwise seem fit for such disposition. 
It should also be clear that we are not advancing any sweeping indict-
ment of judicial consideration of visual or other demonstrative evidence.  
It is not unprecedented for the Supreme Court to attach photographs, maps, 
pictures, and exhibits to its opinions as support and to refer readers to 
them.203  In the aftermath, too, of Scott, judges might well feel embold-
ened to give more decisive weight to the factual inferences they them-
selves are inclined to draw from videos or photographs in deciding sum-
mary judgment motions.204  There might well be compelling grounds for 
objecting to these and like practices,205 but the particular criticism we are 
making of Scott doesn’t go to the propriety of what might be called a “sen-
sory jurisprudence” generally. 
Our concern with the Court’s reliance on the Scott tape is much more 
focused.  At least within the terms of our argument, there is nothing prob-
lematic about a court deciding summarily based on its sensory impressions 
when the factual inference it is drawing isn’t one that is likely to divide 
potential jurors along cultural lines (in a personal injury case, say, where 
the object the plaintiff is seen to be tripping on in a video is his own un-
tied shoelace rather than a raised board in the floor of the defendant’s 
store).  In addition, where a factual inference would likely provoke cultural 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 201 Cf. Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman & John Gastil, A Cultural Critique of Gun Litigation, in SU-
ING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS 
105 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005) (arguing that use of litigation to regulate guns exacerbates cultural 
conflict). 
 202 Cf. David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of Care in Climate Change 
Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1744 (2007) (describing resort to tort cases in response to global 
warming). 
 203 See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 597 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“[O]nly the most meticulous passenger is likely to become aware of the forum-selection provision [in 
the agreement printed on cruise-vacation ticket].  I have . . . appended to this opinion a facsimile of the 
relevant text, using the type size that actually appears in the ticket itself.  A careful reader will find the 
forum-selection clause in the 8th of the 25 numbered paragraphs.”).  See generally Hampton Dellinger, 
Words are Enough: The Troublesome Use of Photographs, Maps, and Other Images in Supreme Court 
Opinions, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1704, 1707 (1997) (stating that “photographs, maps, and other attach-
ments operate as communicative vehicles of economy, all offering the possibility of an impact more 
powerful than words”). 
 204 See, e.g., Green v. N.J. State Police, No. 06-4111, 2007 WL 2453580, at *2 n.1 (3d Cir. Aug. 29, 
2007) (using video evidence to establish facts but affirming denial of summary judgment); Sharp v. 
Fisher, No. 406CV020, 2007 WL 2177123 (S.D. Ga. Jul. 26, 2007) (granting summary judgment on the 
basis of the facts as depicted in a police video, and posting the video to the court’s website). 
 205 See Dellinger, supra note 203. 
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dissensus, our argument would counsel the judge not to draw it even if the 
basis for the inference is nothing other than her mere sensory impression. 
What should a judge do in cases in which she does perceive  
that summary adjudication would create the sort of cultural divisions we 
are describing?  As we have suggested, there are a number of  
possibilities. 
One of them, of course, is to permit the case to be decided by the jury 
notwithstanding the judge’s justifiable belief that a large majority of jurors 
would see the facts as she does.  Even if doing so did not result in a ver-
dict in line with the factual views of the minority groups’ members, man-
dating that the case be decided in a manner that assures their perspective is 
given a respectful hearing makes it possible for them to assent to the out-
come as one consistent with recognition of their status and competence. 
Alternatively, the court can decide the case summarily on some an-
nounced basis that doesn’t stigmatize the potentially aggrieved subcommu-
nity’s view of reality as flawed.  The Court could have done that in Scott, 
we pointed out, by emphasizing either the need for verdict uniformity in 
this area, the adverse policy consequences that would attend a verdict for 
the plaintiff, or the appropriateness of political rather than judicial regula-
tion of high-speed police pursuits. 
That is, appropriate humility does not forbid judges to select an out-
come that is likely to be more congenial to one cultural style or another, 
but only to justify that outcome in terms that avoid cultural partisanship.  
Had Scott been decided on one of these alternative grounds, the outcome 
would likely not have been any less contentious in the eyes of persons who 
subscribe to what we have characterized as the bet cultural style.  But it 
would have been less demeaning to them. 
The law explicitly takes sides all the time on issues that pit conflicting 
cultural values against one another.  In the ordinary tort case, for example, 
communitarians might object to using a cost-benefit calculus to determine 
the scope of the duty to use care.206  In an action for breach of contract, 
individualists might believe that contracting parties should be bound to all 
promises, including those that courts routinely dismiss as “puffery.”207  In 
antitrust cases, the dominant consumer-welfare philosophy will likely be 
much less congenial to egalitarians, who favor a more redistributional ap-
proach, and hierarchs, who might prefer a more corporatist one, than to in-
dividualists.208 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 206 See, e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1020–21 (1994) 
(describing and criticizing this position in academic commentary). 
 207 See generally David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395 (2006) 
(describing multiple areas of law in which puffing claims are taken from juries). 
 208 See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1985) 
(refuting neoclassical efficiency model of antitrust as insufficient in addressing strategic behavior); Her-
bert Hovenkamp, The Rationalization of Antitrust, 116 HARV. L. REV. 917, 920 (2003) (reviewing 
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But when judges enforce the law in a manner that forbids dissenting ju-
rors to override the values reflected in such doctrines, they do so within a 
decisionmaking environment that (normally, at least) evinces respect for 
losers.  The ability of defeated parties to identify with such decisions, not-
withstanding their disagreement with them, is preserved, in part, through 
the law’s genesis, and continued amenability to revision, in democratic 
politics.209  But just as important, the dignity of dissenters is protected by 
idioms of justification, including formalism, that disavow the law’s en-
dorsement of a cultural orthodoxy.  Indeed, the array of techniques associ-
ated with judicial minimalism is animated by a recognition on the part of 
the judiciary that promoting liberal pluralism in law requires judges to at-
tend carefully to the language they use to justify their decisions.210 
Far from promoting that end, proclaiming that there is only one “rea-
sonable” view of the facts in a culturally contentious case needlessly bur-
dens the law with partisanship, detracting from its legitimacy.  That is the 
simple, but important, lesson of Scott. 
CONCLUSION 
To our knowledge, Scott v. Harris is the only case in which the Su-
preme Court has invoked brute sense impressions to justify its decision.211  
Its remarkable invitation to members of the public to download the Scott 
video and decide for themselves what to make of Justice Stevens’s dissent 
reflects the premise that perceptions of “facts” don’t stand in need (or even 
admit) of the sort of reasoned defense we expect when courts make poten-
tially contentious normative judgments.  Our goal in this Article was to 
motivate a critical appraisal of the Court’s premise by determining empiri-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2001)) (describing connection between ideological antitrust 
and competing antitrust theories). 
 209 See WALDRON, DIGNITY, supra note 182. 
 210 See David A. Strauss, Legal Argument and the Overlapping Consensus 20–21 (July 12, 1998) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 132 (1996).  The contribution that idioms of justifica-
tion make to liberal culture independent of the content of the policies being justified is well-developed 
in the study of democratic politics generally.  See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DE-
MOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 14–16 (1996) (defending idioms of justification that evidence “recip-
rocity” and seek to uncover common ground among persons of diverse values); STEPHEN HOLMES, 
PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 234 (1995) (defending 
democratic “gag rules” that constrain appeal to divisive issues of value in order to enable “citizens who 
differ greatly in outlook on life [to] work together to solve common problems”).  How idioms of justifi-
cation in judicial decisions should be structured to promote liberal accommodation warrants a commen-
surate degree of attention and empirical study.  For an existing treatment that ought to serve as a model 
for such investigation, see MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 25–
39 (1987), discussing the West German Supreme Court’s attention to injecting plurality of social mean-
ings into abortion law. 
 211 The closest analogue is probably Justice Stewart’s famous and frequently mocked statement, “I 
know [obscenity] when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.”  Jacobellis v. 
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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cally who would and wouldn’t agree with the majority after viewing the 
tape. 
Our empirical study found that when we “allow the videotape to speak 
for itself,”212 what it says depends on to whom it is speaking.  To be sure, 
a substantial majority of American society is inclined to see in Harris’s 
flight from the police the sort of lethal threat to public safety that in turn 
warrants a potentially deadly response on the part of the police.  But this 
view is not uniform across subcommunities.  Whites and African Ameri-
cans, high-wage earners and low-wage earners, Northeasterners and South-
erners and Westerners, liberals and conservatives, Republicans and Democ-
rats — all significantly varied in their perceptions of the risk that Harris 
posed, on the risk the police posed in deciding to pursue him, and on the 
need to use deadly force against Harris in the interest of reducing public 
risk. 
These patterns suggest the influence of value-motivated cognition.  
Comprising several discrete mechanisms, value-motivated cognition refers 
to the tendency of people to resolve factual ambiguities in a manner that 
generates conclusions congenial to self-defining values. 
This conclusion was compellingly borne out by the relationship of cul-
tural outlooks to views of the tape in Scott.  Individuals disposed to form 
extreme views of the facts in Scott tend to be united by adherence to one 
of two competing sets of preferences about how society should be organ-
ized — one that is egalitarian and communitarian, and another that is hier-
archical and individualistic.  We found that after viewing the Scott tape, 
individuals of the latter outlook formed views emphatically in line with 
those of the Court majority.  Those of the former outlook, in contrast, were 
more likely to see the police, not Harris, as the source of the risk to the 
public and to conclude that use of deadly force was not a justifiable re-
sponse given the risk that Harris posed.  This division brings the conclu-
sions of our study into line with those on cultural cognition generally, 
which show that competing cultural outlooks of these varieties dispose 
people to disagree about the facts of all manner of putative dangers — 
from climate change to gun control to HPV vaccinations for school-age 
girls.213 
What should be made of these findings?  We have argued that they are 
the basis for strongly objecting to the Court’s disposition in Scott.  Our le-
gal system conspicuously holds forth jury decisionmaking as a means of 
making the law responsive to, and hence legitimately binding on, individu-
als of diverse backgrounds.  The basis of the Court’s decision in Scott can-
not be reconciled with this understanding.  It’s true that a majority of 
Americans would indeed see the facts the way the Court did after watching 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 212 Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1775 n.5 (2007). 
 213 See Kahan, supra note 19, at 123, 134–36, 139–42. 
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the Scott tape.  But the minority of persons in our society who would per-
ceive the facts differently are not bare statistical outliers; they are a cohe-
sive and recognizable subcommunity whose members share an identity 
based on common values and experiences.  By asserting that the view of 
the facts these people came away with was one no “reasonable juror” 
could have formed, the Scott majority not only deprived jurors of this iden-
tity of a chance to persuade those of another identity to see things a differ-
ent way.  It also assured that the law established by the case would be seen 
by members of that subcommunity as deriving from a process calculated to 
exclude their voices from even being heard. 
There were multiple avenues available to the Court for reversing in 
Scott, we have suggested.  But the justification it chose was the one that 
maximized the experience of exclusion for a recognizable segment of the 
American citizenry, needlessly infusing the decision with culturally parti-
san overtones that detracted from the law’s legitimacy. 
We do not mean, however, to attribute bad faith to the Court.  On the 
contrary, we have suggested that it’s likely that the Court in Scott unwit-
tingly fell prey to cognitive illiberalism — and dragged the rest of us along 
with it.  Sincerely perceiving the facts to be unambiguous, the Court con-
cluded, with considerable foundation, that only those in the grip of a parti-
san set of cultural commitments could see things otherwise.  But in saying 
that, the Court necessarily made itself into a culturally partisan decision-
maker in the eyes of those who saw, with just as much foundation, that the 
Court’s own view of the facts was culturally motivated.  This is how honest 
disagreements of fact in our society mutate into recriminatory sources of 
cultural conflict among persons who in truth have no desire to enforce a 
moral orthodoxy through law. 
The incompatibility of liberal principles with the use of law to impose 
a partisan vision of the good is well understood.  Our legal and political 
practices are replete with devices that not only forbid full-blooded sectari-
anism of this type but also effectively stifle even latent forms of it in their 
incipiency, lest rhetorical misadventure impel citizens into illiberal conflict 
against their will.  In political life, these include the norm of public reason, 
which requires legislators and ordinary citizens to justify policies on 
grounds accessible to persons of diverse moral and cultural persuasions in-
stead of in terms that reflect a partisan conception of the good.214  In the 
legal arena, they include devices like formalism and minimalism, which 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 214 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 175, 217–18 (1993) (articulating a norm of 
“public reason” that prohibits political actors in most contexts from invoking “comprehensive” doc-
trines that “include[] conceptions of what is of value in human life, as well as ideals of personal virtue 
and character,” id. at 175, and instead requires them to “explain . . . how the principles and policies 
they advocate and vote for can be supported by” considerations, id. at 217, consistent with “a diversity 
of reasonable religious and philosophical doctrines,” id. at 218). 
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enable judges to defend outcomes and elaborate the law without resort to 
more contentious moral claims.215 
What’s not nearly so well understood, however, is the threat that com-
peting understandings of fact pose to a liberal society.  Indeed, forms of 
advocacy that feature seemingly neutral factual claims about how to pro-
mote societal welfare (“optimal deterrence,” “cost-benefit analysis,” “con-
tingent valuation” and the like) are thought to be among the practices that 
dissipate illiberal conflict by avoiding reference to more contentious judg-
ments of value.216  It might seem natural to see judicial idioms that focus 
on “facts” as conflict-avoiding for the same reason.217  But because we in-
evitably recur to our cultural values to evaluate empirical claims about 
what conditions threaten our welfare and what policies promote it, styles 
of argumentation that feature facts can polarize us every bit as much as 
one that deals with differences of value in a transparent way.218 
We have proposed a form of judicial humility as one technique for 
ameliorating such conflict.  But such a strategy, we concede, will on its 
own make only a modest contribution to this end.  Much more attention to 
solving the problem of cognitive illiberalism is needed, in both the legal 
and the political domains. 
Accepting the Court’s peculiar invitation in Scott hasn’t shown that 
every “reasonable” person would see the facts in that case the way the ma-
jority did.  But it has, we think, helped make it possible for every reason-
able citizen to see something much more important: that just as critical to 
liberalism as developing strategies for dissipating cultural conflict over 
values is the development of strategies for dissipating cultural conflict over 
facts. 
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